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Introduction:
Turkey and Israel had been strong allies in the Middle East, however in
recent years, these relations have turned sour. Turkey was the first predominantly
Muslim country to recognize the state of Israel upon its creation in 1948. However,
Present day Turkey has gone as far as to pull its ambassador from Tel Aviv. The
importance and implication of the decline in relations between Turkey and Israel
will be explained in the following chapters. The examination of Turkish foreign
policy, and specifically a history of its relations with Israel, gives a basis to explain
the changes that occurred with their relationship. With an understanding of the
historical implications of Turkish‐Israeli relations, each country will be looked at
from its own perspective. Through each country’s view, there will be a cost benefit
analysis of how the decline has affected each polity. Ultimately, the loss in relations
is unfortunate for both nations, and may have implications for the Middle East in
general. The analysis of the downfall of the relationship yields that Israel suffers
most from the changes in relations.
The Republic of Turkey was created in 1923, and from this point until 2002,
the general sentiment towards foreign policy had revolved around the philosophies
of Kemal Ataturk. The leader of the Turkish nationalist movement in the war of
independence had a clear intention for Turkey to become part of the West. All of his
foreign policies reflected his efforts to move westward, and become a part of
Europe. Throughout this time, Turkey and Israel engaged in different types of
alliances. In the 1950s, the two nations were part of a secret alliance, and their
relations remained constant until 1990. In the 1990s, the two countries heightened
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their relations, and entered a public military agreement in 1996. This agreement
had negative implications for Turkey’s relations with the Arab world.
In 2002, the Justice and Development Party won majority in the parliament,
and from this point on, the Israeli‐Turkish relations were on the decline. In
alignment with the events of the Palestinian‐Israeli conflict, this created a climate
for negative relations. The boiling point of the relations, as seen by the rest of world,
was the “Free Gaza” flotilla that left from Turkish ports and made an attempt to
break through Israel’s blockade of Gaza. The boat was boarded by Israeli soldiers
and as a result, left 8 Turkish civilians, and one U.S. citizen dead. This situation
solidified the decline in relations between Israel and Turkey. It had implications
internationally, and affected public opinion within both Israel and Turkey.
For Israel, its alliance with Turkey was very important for regional politics.
The Turkish‐Israeli relationship was a source of pride for its government and
citizens. Along with the socio‐political benefits, the relationship brought economic
prosperity. The decline of relations highlighted a major weakness in Israeli foreign
policy. Specifically, with its current policies, Israel does not view public relations as
a way to combat international security threats. With the downfall of the relations,
Turkey started to align with other nations, creating a security threat for Israel.
Turkey has engaged Hamas and strengthened its ties with Israel’s enemies, Syria
and Iran.
For Turkey, the loss of relations manifested itself in a different manner. On
one hand, there were a few losses for Turkey; specifically Turkey’s tourism suffered
significant economic hits due to Israeli boycotts. Also, if the trend in Israeli‐Turkish
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relation continues, there may be an effect on Turkish‐US and Turkish‐EU relations.
On the other hand, the loss of such strong ties with Israel gave Turkey the
opportunity to create alliances with major players in the region. The European
Union, up until now, has rejected Turkey’s application. This lack of acceptance has
provoked Turkey to look towards the Middle East for a role in the global
community. Furthermore, without the political baggage associated with Israel,
Turkey was able to create stronger relations with other nations, most notably Iran
and Syria. Overall, the decline in Israeli‐Turkish relations allows Turkey the
opportunity to take advantage of its position within the Middle East.
An examination the cost‐benefit analysis for both Turkey and Israel, shows
that the loss is overwhelmingly more severe for Israel than it is for Turkey. Through
this divergence, Israel is loosing the only warm relationship it has in the Middle
East. The recent revolutionary uprising in the Middle Eastern, have created a much
more hostile situation Israel and its regional foreign policy. Turkey has taken
advantage of new foreign policy opportunities and there appears to be minimal
damage to Turkish national security.
Although the recent events have created grim relations between the two
states, there is a possibility for change in the future. The new philosophy of Turkish
foreign policy allows for possible change in the relationship. Also, the democratic
structure of the Turkish government may create a situation in which leading
opposition party, who support strong ties with Israel, may gain the majority. Finally,
In light of the revolution in Egypt, Israel has expressed desires to create a speedy
remedy for the Palestinian‐Israeli conflict, which would drastically improve the
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Turkish‐Israel relation. All in all, with minor changes to the political environment of
the two nations, it is possible to see an increase in the strength of the relationship
between the two states.
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Chapter 1: A History of Turkish Foreign Policy
In 1923 the Republic of Turkey was officially born with newfound ideas that
were Western oriented. Throughout the twentieth century, Turkey had stable and
consistent foreign relations, with a strong pull towards the West. In that same
fashion, Turkish‐Israeli relations developed consistently throughout the earlier
history of the two countries. The two countries over time were consistently more
willing and able to have public relations, regardless of how this relationship was
received by the global community. However, as the political party in power in
Turkey changed, so did the Israeli‐Turkish diplomatic relations. Ultimately there
was a change in this long‐time friendship between the two nations.
Turkish foreign policy is the result of an aggregation of many different
factors. Many of these stem from internal, domestic policy issues, which then reflect
upon its foreign policy. There is a cultural clash between the Kurds living in Turkey
and the rest of the population. In the southeast of Turkey there is a large Kurdish
population whose demands from the government are different from those of the
rest of the population. The cultural differences lend themselves to conflicting
interests of foreign policy, specifically with the Mosul issue in Iraq. There is also a
constant internal battle between the secular, political elite, and Islamic political
movements, which also influence foreign policy. At the same time, Turkey struggles
from an identity crisis; is it a European nation or Middle Eastern? One scholar, Kut,
has explained that throughout the history of this modern polity, it appears that for
the majority of the time, in spite of its domestic political instability, Turkey has
maintained consistent and unwavering foreign policy (Kut 10‐11).
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In order to explain the progression of Turkish foreign affairs, it is crucial to
understand the history that precedes it. The Ottoman Empire was occupied in the
late 1910s, which sparked a nationalist movement. Shortly after, with British
encouragement, Greece invaded part of the Ottoman territory, and the nationalist
movement (in what is present day Turkey) flamed up. In 1919 the Associations for
the Defense of Rights was created in order to front the revolution. This group was
led by Mustafa Kemal who ultimately Ottoman nationalist party to an eventual
victory. The Associations for the Defense of Rights was part of the Grand National
Assembly (GNA) and it used nationalism and religious symbols in order to rally
support for the cause. Soon the movement has 60 religious leaders join the GNA in
support of the movement. The last Ottoman parliament of 1919 reflected the
growing support of the nationalist movement, revealing support in Ankara. It had a
powerful body of people who were able to fight against the sultan’s government in
Istanbul, and more importantly the Entente 1 . The sultan had agreed for Greece to
advance into Anatolia, and created the struggle for the Turkish nationalists
(Altunisk and Tur 13‐14).
In the meantime, Ankara had signed a peace agreement with Armenia, which
shortly after became part of the Soviet Union, giving the nationalist movement
military support. Kemal, the leader of the revolution, took the name Ataturk, which
meant “father of the Turks”. The war of independence was ultimately successful; an
armistice was signed on October 11th, 1922. This armistice was signed between the
British and Kemal’s new government (Altunisk and Tur 13‐15). Finally, after the
1

After the Ottoman’s were defeated in WW1, the entente, or allies, was the enemy for the Turkish
Nationalist.

9
nationalist movement was victorious, the Lausanne conference was set up to
establish peace in the region. Even though two issues were left undecided, the treaty
was finally signed after eight months of deliberation, on July 24th 1923, granting
sovereignty to a new Turkish state (Altunisk and Tur 15).
Mustafa Kemal had desires of modernity for his new nation. He and his
supporters looked towards Europe when establishing the workings of the polity.
Ataturk had the challenge of implementing a modern political system while
attaining a sense of Turkish nationalism. He took the necessary steps to create this
modern nation state, which included writing a constitution, sending the sultanate
into exile the year before, and therefore abolishing the caliph. The caliph interpreted
and ruled Muslim law, which legitimized the sultanate. With the abolishing of the
caliph, Ataturk’s Turkey was transformed from religious to secular.
Furthermore, the new state created a party system based upon a
parliamentary system. Ataturk created the People’s Party, which would later be
called the Republican’s People Party. The constitution was accepted on October 29th
1923, officially creating the Republic of Turkey (Altunisk and Tur 16‐17). The
caliph dominated the previous legal system and now a new secular code of law
overrode Islamic law. With these changes came one to the dismay of already literate
Turkish citizens. Ataturk changed the Turkish alphabet from Arabic to Latin Arabic,
in attempts to solidify the progress of modernity. With this change, Turkey officially
entered new secular territory that would look much different than the Ottoman
Empire that preceded it.
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Ataturk’s concerns with foreign policy contained a specific agenda. One basic
principle was that Turkey should limit its influence and involvement within the
Middle East (Larrabee 1013). The central argument to this is that Turkey would
benefit from emulating the West, for this is where the future lay. Turkey would
continue to look Westward under the Republican’s People Party, and not until 2002
would this change.
Considering the European orientation of young Turkey, during World War II
it was imperative that Turkey made a decision as to how it would act. There were
conflicting loyalties for Turkey during World War II. Due to the peace agreement
Turkey had signed with the Soviets, there were complications for Turkey after the
German‐Soviet Non‐Aggression Pact was signed. There was pressure from Germany,
and from the Allies, specifically Great Britain, and Turkey was caught in the middle
as far as foreign policy went. On October 19th, 1939 Turkey signed the Anglo‐
Franco‐Turkish treaty of mutual respect. In essence this eradicated any obligations
that Turkey would have had in helping the allied forces during World War II. It was
seen as a last resort treaty for Turkey, and Great Britain saw the treaty as a way to
ensure that the Balkans and Middle East would not fall to the Axis powers (Altunisk
and Tur 100‐101). This marks one of the first stable foreign policies that the
Republic of Turkey implemented in its earlier years.
After the end of the Second World War, and the rise of the Cold War, Turkey
faced a turning point in its foreign policy. Turkey saw the Cold War as a way to
become closer to the Western powers. The policies instated by Turkey were rooted
in the creation of the Republic of Turkey; during the years after World War II

11
Turkey created stronger bonds with the West. At this point, Turkey and the Soviet
Union’s interests had been diverging. The Soviets had been too demanding and
wanted specific territory from Turkey. Also, Turkey was seen as a threat by the
Soviet Union, because of its ability to relate to the portion of Muslim individuals
within the Soviet Union (Altunisk and Tur 103).
The deeper ties with the West were reflected in the Truman Doctrine and
Marshal Plan. U.S. President Harry Truman created the Truman Doctrine on March
12th 1947, in order to assist countries, specifically Turkey and Greece, from falling
into the hands of the Soviet Union. Under the Truman Doctrine, Turkey was
included in the Western bloc, and began to receive financial assistance from the
United States. Under the Marshal Plan the United States promises assistance, both
military and economic, to war torn countries, and Turkey was eventually included
as a country that received assistance (Altunisk and Tur 103‐104).
Turkey was included into the Western bloc at this point; however, it was
concerned about its chances of getting into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO). NATO is “the pillar of the post‐war order as far as the Western bloc is
concerned” (Altunisk and Tur 104). Turkey first pleaded its case for admission in
NATO in 1950, and was rejected by both Britain and the United States. The United
States did not want to take on more security commitments than it was already
engaged in, and Great Britain thought that Turkey would detract from creating an
Atlantic Community, under the Atlantic pact. Turkey was not situated in the Atlantic
Region of the world; thus, the Middle Eastern country would create a different
global community than the one Great Britain desired (Yesilbursa 74‐77).
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However, within the next two years, Turkey’s case was made, and it was
accepted into NATO in 1952. Ultimately, Turkey was seen as a Mediterranean
power, which would be able to aid the United States. In addition, the United States
believed that if the West showed no interest in aligning itself with Turkey, it would
join the Soviet efforts in the Cold War. This was not in the best interest of the
Western powers (Altunisk and Tur 105). Furthermore, the United States began to
understand the importance of Middle Eastern politics and Turkey was seen as a
Middle Eastern power that, as an ally, would increase the United States’ power
globally. Regardless of the amount of security ties the U.S. currently had, it was in its
best interest to create an alliance with Turkey (Yesilbursa 80‐81).
The alliance between Turkey and the Western world had implications for
Turkey’s role in the Middle East. Moreover, it had implications for Turkish‐Arab
relations. Once Turkey was accepted into NATO, while the Republican People’s Party
maintained power in Turkey, the agenda seemed to be the same: maintain and
enhance relations with the West. Keeping this in mind, the Arab‐Turkish relations
during this time frame were weak, and the Arab nations were suspicious of Turkey’s
intentions in regards to foreign policy revolving around the Middle East (Nafi 68).
As far as the Arab nations were concerned, there was no evidence that the new
Turkish nation would have Arab interests in mind through its foreign policy actions;
there was no sign that Kemalist interests and Arab interests would coincide (Nafi
67). Most of Turkey’s attention was focused on building its ties with the West, and
that would reflect upon Turkish‐Arab relations.
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Furthermore, throughout the 1960s and 1970s the Arab world saw two
players in Turkish domestic politics. First were the political elites, supporters of
Ataturk, who led the Republican Party, and were fully backed by the Turkish
military; their interests seemed to clash with those of the Arab nations. A prime
example of this complex political dynamic is Turkey’s involvement in the Baghdad
Pact of 1955. This pact was between Turkey and Iraq, and later Iran, Pakistan and
Britain joined. It was perceived as anti‐Arab in the sense that this alliance was
threatening to the Arab world, as opposed to coexisting with the Arab world, which
was the true intent (Bengio and Ozcan 54). The Arab world had become increasingly
more pious and more Islamic during the 20th century. Along side the political elites,
the Islamic political groups were present in Turkey. With this in mind, the players
within Turkey who had these same values appealed to the Arab world and created
signs of hope for them (Nafi 69‐71).
The Turkish response to the 1967 Arab‐Israeli war created a different
sentiment in the Arab world towards Turkey. Turkey, though remaining Western
oriented, showed solidarity with the Arab world in regards to its defeat (Nafi 69).
More specifically the developments within Turkey politically had a positive effect on
its relations with the Arab world. The Turkish Left in particular showed sympathy
for the Palestinian cause, which helped the relations. Furthermore, with
developments within Turkey of Islamic parties during the 1970s and 1980s, which
drew upon Turkey’s Ottoman heritage, Arab‐Turkish relations strengthened (Nafi
70).
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The political elite throughout the 20th century had been consistently secular.
There was a large Islamic population, which desired a more Middle Eastern oriented
foreign policy. By 2002, Turkey had elected an Islamic political group into power.
The party came to be in a post 9/11 world, and should be considered a prime
example of a well‐intentioned Islamic group with democratic principles (Inbar 594‐
595).
To a large degree, Turkish‐Israeli relations shape Arab‐Turkish relations. In
fact, Turkey is sometimes torn between the Israelis and the rest of the Middle East
with regard to foreign policy. However, up until recently, there has been a strong
relation between Israel and Turkey. As Bengio and Ozcan write, “Turkey’s
recognition of Israel has remained a painful memory in the annals of the Arab‐
Turkish relations and a stumbling block for real development”(58). To the Arab
world, with the recognition of Israel, Turkey had abandoned the Palestinian cause,
and betrayed much of the Arab world (Bengio and Ozcan 57). Regardless of the
implication on Arab relations, Turkey had maintained steady relation with Israel.
The roots of the relationship between Turkey and Israel began before Israel
was officially a state. Israel is a Jewish nation, and Turkey had been a place of refuge
for many Jews during its history. Even during the Ottoman Empire, Jews found it a
place of asylum. The most obvious display of Turkish willingness to help Jews was
during World War II. The Jews of Turkey, and essentially Europe, were able to find a
safe haven in Turkey, when almost no other place offered the same.
Israel became an independent nation state in 1948. Turkey was the first
predominantly Muslim nation to recognize Israel. With this recognition began a
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series of public and private alliances between the two nations. Thus, diplomatic
relations have existed between Israel and Turkey since 1948. There have been shifts
in the relationship from the birth of Israel until the present day; however, in a large
way Israel and Turkey have been allies in the Middle East (Inbar).
Under Menderes’s leadership during the first part of the 1950s, Turkey was
initially reluctant to engage in a formal alliance with Israel. However, in 1958, the
two polities formed a secretive alliance, called the Peripheral Alliance (Brandenburg
2‐3). The Peripheral Alliance was derivative of Uzel’s idea of creating an alliance
between all the non‐Arab cultural groups in the region. This alliance would have
included Marinates in Lebanon, Jews of Israel, Turkish, Greeks, Kurds, Armenians,
Assyrians and Persians. The idea of the Peripheral Alliance was based upon the
notion that there were more non‐Arabs than Arabs living in the region, yet Arab
nations maintained authority in the region. Thus the alliance would attempt to
balance the power in the region. This ideal of the periphery alliance was not
realized, mainly due to the conflicts between the marginalized groups. However,
Turkey and Israel did enter a bilateral secret alliance (Bengio).
The cause of the secrecy of the relationship between Turkey and Israel was
due to the fragility of the Arab‐Turkish relationship. The alliance was not meant to
provoke a counter alliance, nor was it to attract any sort of attention. Rather, it was
meant as a strategic alliance to serve in the best interest of Israel and Turkey. The
two nations had a common threat, and the bilateral agreement added to the military
capacity of the two nations and was a form of security (Bengio 35).
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The reason Turkey in particular went into this alignment was due to the
unsteady regime in Iraq. Turkey felt threatened by a potential dramatic shift in the
Iraqi regime, which could have threatened the Baghdad Pact. Also, Israel was
offering to balance the powers in the region against Arab control. With its Western
orientation, Turkey felt this to be the best foreign policy strategy (Brandenburg 3).
In the end, most scholars believe that Israel played the driving role in constituting
the 1958 Peripheral Alliance.
Israel was more persistent in creating ties with Turkey because the 1958
Peripheral Alliance served a more important role for them than for Turkey (Bengio
73). Israel was alone in the region, and it was a young country surrounded by
enemies. Turkey served as a strategic alliance for Israel in the sense that it had no
other alliances in the region. History shows that the hostility within the region
would only escalate, with the 1967 Arab‐Israeli war, and the Yom Kippur war soon
to come. Thus, it was extremely important for Israel to attain some sort of alliance in
the meantime. Turkey, on the other hand, had a stable foreign policy, strongly
rooted in Kemalist ideology, and had just been accepted into NATO. The necessity
for an alliance with Israel was not of top priority, and it had potential to threaten its
interaction with the rest of the Arab region.
The relations under the secret pact between Israel and Turkey were
maintained until 1966. In 1966 the head of the Turkish military froze the
agreements between Israel and Turkey because of the Untied State’s policies in
regards to the Turkish‐Greek conflict. The United States had been support Greek
policy as opposed to Turkish policy. Greece and Turkey had become NATO members
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simultaneously; yet at a time when the two nations should have related to one
another, there was a major conflict. The conflict between Greece and Turkey
revolved around the Greek isle of Cyprus. Turkey’s main concern was access to the
Aegean port, and sovereignty of maritime and air space in order to have military
strategic control. Much of the issue revolves around the fact that Greece controlled
the majority of Cyprus (Bahcheli 131‐135). Thus, the conflict infiltrated other areas
of foreign policy, and affected Turkish‐Israeli relations, based upon Israel’s alliance
with the United States. Even though the Israelis were not directly attacking Turkey,
the Turkish military felt that it could use Israel as a negotiation tool with the United
States. Ultimately, the bilateral relations between Israel and Turkey were held
intact; however, there were no more advances in relations for many years to come
(Brandenburg 4).
During the early 1990s, relations between Israel and Turkey began to warm
up. In 1991, Turkey declared that it would raise the status of Israel 2 to embassy
status, which allowed for a closer relationship between the two nations than they
had in the past. In part, the Arab‐Israel peace process that was represented in the
Madrid Conference in October of 1991 and the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993
legitimized Turkey’s public involvement with Israel (Brandenburg 5). Turkey could
now be open about its relations with Israel without sending threatening signals to
the Arab world (Bengio 78‐80).
The early 1990s was truly a period of increased positive relations between
Turkey and Israel. Not only was Israel now a legitimate partner for the Turks but
2

It also raises Palestine to embassy Status
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also relations between Arab nations and Turkey had been decreasing. Turkish total
exports to the Middle East dropped 14 percent between 1987 and 1993 (Altunisik
60). At the same time, Turkish and Israeli interests had become more and more
similar. For example, they both had similar concerns in regards to Syria. Turkey and
Israel shared a bond in the desire to strengthen their relationship with Syria. Israel’s
conflict with Syria had partially to do with the larger Arab‐Israeli conflict, but also it
was an issue of land. Israel shares part of its border to the north with Syria, and had
had a major conflict over land since the 1967 war. Turkey had conflicts regarding
how Syria reacted to the Kurdish problem. Syria has a Kurdish population of its own,
and Syria’s response was not consistent with that of Turkey. This will be discussed
further in Chapter 3. The Syrian issue strengthened Turkish‐Israeli compatibility,
which complemented the Western orientation of both nations. Finally, the political
elite were backed by the military, and made it clear that involvement would
ultimately benefit Turkey (Inbar 591‐592). With those factors in place, Turkey
began to normalize its relations with Israel in the early nineties (Altunisk 61).
It is not until 1996 that Turkey and Israel would sign an open agreement. On
February 23rd, 1996 a bilateral alignment between Turkey and Israel was made
official which was focused around military trades. Many people in the government
saw this as simply a formality, as opposed to the peak of relations, due to the
constant diplomatic contact during the years leading up to this event. However,
other countries view this move as a turning point in their relations, which was a
critical component to the agreement (Bengio 103‐110). “To the outside world the
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main event that put Turkish‐Israeli relations on the map was the agreement…”
(Bengio 108).
While Turkey was advancing its military capability through its alignment
with Israel, Israel was gaining something else. To Israel, having diplomatic relations
with other countries in the region was vital to its foreign policy. Israel was a country
isolated from its neighbors, looking for allies in the region. The fact that Turkey
became its public ally is arguably one of the best things it received out of the 1996
agreement (Bengio 119). Moreover, the importance of this agreement was apparent
not only through military and intelligence factors but economic factors as well
(Bengio 108).
The military alliance was a reflection in part of their common threat: Syria.
This was a preceding critical issue that brought the two countries into alliance. As
far as the military benefits of the agreement went, there was substantive exchange
of military technology, as well as aspects that were not as concrete. For example,
there was exchange of military training. With the conjoining of the two nations, the
new balance of power decreased the impending threat of Syria on both Israel and
Turkey. Moreover, Turkey tried to mediate some kind of relations between Israel
and Syria; although unsuccessful, it was still an attempt (Walker 81‐83).
In terms of economic gains, Israel and Turkey came out with different results.
With this new open foreign relationship, Turkey in particular opened its doors to
Israeli industry. Many Israeli companies moved factories, or headquarters to
different parts of Turkey. However, many Turkish businessmen felt that Israel did
not open its doors in the same manner to help Turkish industry grow. In Israel’s
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defense, it was argued that Israel lacked the physical space to invite in Turkish
businesses (Alturnisik 67).
On the domestic front, there was some discussion as to what effects this
agreement would have. In Israel there was minimal debate, because most Israelis
were on board with the Turkish‐Israeli alliance. Like their government, Israeli
citizens were eager to have a friend in the region. On the other hand, in Turkey there
was some debate as to whether this move was positive or negative for the Turkish
nation. There is constant debate between different news sources, and other public
outlets, about Israel. The sentiment within Turkey about Israel, and Turkish public
opinion on its policies with Israel was in constant debate. However, at the time that
the agreement was signed, the political elite and a lot of the Turkish public were in
support of Israel (Bengio 120).
There was nonetheless contestation to the policies towards Israel within the
Turkish public. Not only were there citizens in Turkey who questioned the alliance
with Israel on a fundamental level, but they also questioned the legitimacy of the
agreement. Many people highlighted how militarily oriented the agreement was,
and whether the actions of the military truly reflected the will of the Turkish people.
In addition, according to the Turkish constitution, the committee on foreign
relations was supposed to negotiate any kind of agreement with other countries. In
this case, the military was the body that signed the agreement and in doing so they
went against the authority of the committee on foreign relations. The military
defended its actions by stating that these were times of international crisis and that
the military had the authority to proceed with the actions it did because it was doing
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so in the interest of international security (Bengio 120‐127). This was referring to
the arms agreement, and the potential threat that Turkey could be put in without
the advancements in military arms. Turkey and Israel created a military agreement
that would subsequently help Turkey defend itself.
One important point of consideration regarding the 1996 agreement
between Israel and Turkey is the Arab response. Though the agreement was not
meant to provoke any of the surrounding Arab nations, it definitely brought some
suspicion among the surrounding nations about Israeli‐Turkish intentions. The
regional perception of Israeli‐Turkish relations changed, and this created unease in
many of the surrounding countries (Walker 79).
There is abundant evidence, specifically in the press, that the Arab world felt
threatened shortly after the agreement was made official. Ugur Akinci expresses
that the Arabs were scared that the alignment was actually an anti‐Arab pact and
that specifically Syria was very worried (Turkish Daily News). The mentality behind
the fright from the Arab nations was rational. The two countries represent the two
biggest military players in the region, and with the newfound bond, there was a
subsequent shift in the balance of power in the region. Finally, what shocked some
of the countries were the close ties both Israel and Turkey had with the United
States, which brought added hard power to the equation (Walker 79‐80).
Israeli‐Turkish relations were especially strong when the Republican
People’s Party, and other secular parties, stayed in power; however, there would be
a turn in relations that coincided with the change in regime power in Turkey. In
2002 the AKP party took control. Subsequently, relations between Israel and Turkey
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changed. Much of the change in relations was documented by the media sources
throughout Turkey, especially the newspapers in Turkey.
It is clear that there was a change in the perception of Israel in the Turkish
media. After the agreement in 1996, the articles written represent the Turkish‐
Israeli relationship in a relatively positive light. For example, Cevik argues that ill‐
informed domestic newspapers are perpetually blurring the facts of the Israeli‐
Turkish alliance, in his opinion. He explains that these authors are dramatizing facts
and realties in order to have more appeal for their writing. He refers to one article in
particular that blows out of proportion the military interaction between Israel and
Turkey, and essentially creates conspiracy theories around Israeli military support
in Turkey. Cevik reassures that the purpose of the Turkish‐Israeli military
interaction in this incident was simply to train Turkish pilots. In essence, the author
defends Israeli‐Turkey relations, in the widespread national newspaper (Turkish
Daily News).
A second article shows strong support for Israel. It depicts the strong
historical ties between Israel and Turkey, and describes the lack of reason for a
disfiguration of the relationship (Bagci). A third article describes the critical issues
that the Turkish‐Israeli relations were faced with. It acknowledges the different
sentiments within Israel and asks for Turkey to maintain its relations with Israel.
Cevik provides two reasons as to why this would benefit Turkey. First and foremost,
although anti‐Israeli sentiment existed in Turkey in 1997, he believes that the
majority of Turkish citizens believe Israel has the right to exist. Secondly, he
believes that Turkey needs to play a role in the conflicts of the region, and to do so
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Israeli‐Turkish relations must be upheld (Cevik “The Things Israelis Don’t Want to
Hear”). It is important to note that, as positive as the press was, there was always an
undertone of hesitation or negativity throughout the 90s. In other words, it is clear
that the press represented the importance of the Turkish‐Israeli relationship;
however, it did not hide the negatives either.
Moving into the 20th century, after the AKP took leadership in Turkey, there
is a clear shift in the press coverage of Israel. The same newspapers that earlier
depicted Israel in a positive light now had many more negative comments about
Israel. Different authors had different opinions about Israel; however, most of what
was said was negative. There were claims that Israel was fostering hatred, the
articles criticize? the way Israel was handling its own domestic policy in regards to
the Palestinian issue, and, most radically different, the articles attack Israeli‐Turkish
relations. One article proclaimed that the AKP party cannot act as a mediator
between the Palestinians and the Israelis. The author of the article felt that it was
detrimental to Turkey’s politics. Turkey did not need the political baggage that came
along with mending Palestinian‐Israeli relations (Aras). This view may not have
been the completely dominant view, as Turkey would seek to adopt a much more
soft power role in foreign policy, but this was indeed negative press.
Not only was there a change in the press, but also, more importantly, there
was a change in political actions that signified a change of relations between Israel
and Turkey. To be clear, there had been no official change to the 1996 defense
agreement; rather there had been continuous change in policy and actions from
leaders in Turkey which implied a change in relations. These dramatic changes in
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the relationship between Turkey and Israel confirm that actions speak louder than
words.
In early 2002 when the AKP party was first elected, there was an initial
threat to the stability of the long‐standing alliance between Israel and Turkey.
However, there was no fallout within the relationship because of the U.S. invasion
into Iraq and the first Gulf War. The two nations, Turkey and Israel, both shared a
unifying goal in establishing a democratic nation in Iraq. These efforts in fact
became the glue to their relationship in 2002. In the interest of national security, the
AKP understood that Turkey and Israel needed to maintain their relationship, at
least superficially. Under the surface however, the Iraq War instigated Turkey’s
talking with governments that were anti‐Israel such as their common concern, Syria.
Ultimately, Turkey and Israel were not able to maintain the type of relationship they
shared in 1990 (Walker 86).
There are two key factors that have significantly influenced the decline in
Turkish‐Israeli relations: the change in the party that held power in the Turkish
parliament and the Palestinian‐Israeli ongoing conflict. The Gaza war in particular is
a key factor in the ultimate decline in relations between Israel and Turkey (Bahgat
65). Furthermore, it is a constant unresolved conflict as it coincides with the new
leadership in Turkey, which could be why the relationships declined.
The Palestinian‐Israeli conflict reached a peak point for three weeks between
December of 2008 and January of 2009, which Israel called Operation Cast Lead.
Israel was responding to the Qassam rockets fired by Hamas into Israel; Israel
argued that it was fighting out of self‐defense. Israel was criticized for using too
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much force against Gaza, and carrying out a collective punishment for the actions of
Hamas. At the same time, Israel had a difficult time fighting the battle against
Hamas. Hamas combatants had not been in uniform when fighting against Israel and
furthermore strategic sites were placed around schools. Therefore, Israel had been
put in a very difficult situation. Operation Cast Lead created a lot of reaction
internationally, and Turkey was not the exception.
In 2005, Erdogan made a diplomatic visit to Israel. He met with the Israeli
prime minister at the time, Ariel Sharon. Subsequently, he made a visit to Ramallah.
On this visit, Erdogan made a remark that Israeli‐Turkish relations constituted a
historical relationship (Nafi 73). His later remarks would not be as forgiving in
regards to Israel.
The change in Ankara’s position towards Israel created an imbalance in the
pre‐existing Turkish, Israeli, and Arab foreign policy interests. With the AKP in
power, Turkey now called upon the shared religion between themselves and the
Arab nations in order to create unity in the Middle East. This left Israel out of the
equation, and ties between the nations became increasing more difficult. The actions
of the country, and the remarks of its leaders, clearly indicated a decline in Israeli‐
Turkish relations.
The actions of the Erdogan‐led government undermined the relationship that
had been established between the Israelis and the Turks. Most dramatically, in 2006
Khalid Mashaal, a representative from Hamas, made a visit to the capital of Turkey,
Ankara, and met with President Gul (Walker 86). Arguably the most threatening
political group to Israel, Hamas was welcomed into the country of Turkey. Although
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this was the case, at the same time Mashaal was not welcomed in the Turkish
foreign ministry; instead he met with Gul in the headquarters of the AKP party. It is
also significant that the Prime Minister, Erdagon, did not meet him; rather he was
only welcomed by Gul. After this event, there was no serious disturbance between
the international relations between Israel and Turkey (Nafi 72‐74).
Regardless, Israel should be very wary of this kind of act. This is a serious
change in the diplomatic actions Turkey had been taking, which implies a change of
foreign relations between Turkey and Israel. Furthermore, even though Erdagon’s
specific actions did not reflect the change, he has voiced many harsh remarks
against Israel. Since the AKP has been in power, there has been a decline in
relations between Israel and Turkey.
After the 2008 military engagement by Israel in Gaza, Erdogan vocally
defended Hamas. He proclaimed that Israel would have to pay for the atrocities it
was committing against the Palestinian people. He has also stated that Israel was
engaging in state‐sponsored terrorism in regard to how it was treating the
Palestinian people in Gaza (Brandenberg 9). He called the 2008 military actions of
Israel an atrocity. He made very public remarks that reiterate this notion. In a
televised meeting with his party, the Justice and Development Party, he said, “this
act against the populace in Gaza, who have already been in a type of open‐air prison,
is a blow to peace” (Today’s Zamman “Erdogan Angered by Israel’s Gaza campaign”).
It became clear that Ankara no longer shared the same opinion on its relationship
with Israel as it had previously.
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The remarks stem from different pressures that the AKP was experiencing.
There was domestic pressure from his fellow AKP party members, and Turkish
civilians, against the support of Israel. There had been no invitation from the
European Union to Turkey; thus, the polity started to look eastwards in terms of
foreign policy and alignment. Furthermore, Erdogan saw Israeli aggression with
Gaza as a factor that ruined the Syrian‐Israeli peace initiative, which Erdogan had
tried to softly negotiate. These factors only led to a downward spiral in terms of
Israeli‐Turkish relations. Frankly, the evidence of the declining relation is present
(Bahgat 65‐68).
The culmination of the AKP’s actions indicating the declining Israeli‐ Turkish
relations which made this fact clear to the international community was the flotilla
incident in spring of 2010. The flotilla incident is greatly affected by, and has
implications upon, the Gaza war. Since 2008 there has been an economic blockade
by Israel on Hamas‐controlled Gaza. The method of letting goods in and out has
been a white list. As opposed to a black list, a white list means that only goods on the
list can go into the territory; if it is not on the list, it is not allowed in. This blockade
created increasing hostility around the world‐‐and within AKP‐ruled Turkey
(Bahgat 64‐75).
This situation provoked harsh feelings, especially in the Turkish population,
as many felt that the way Israel was treating the Palestinian territory was unjust. In
May of 2010, six boats ‐‐or the “free Gaza flotilla” ‐‐ departed from Turkey for Gaza,
claiming to be a humanitarian mission to bring goods to Gaza. The flotilla was sent
not by Erdogan or the AKP party; rather it was planned and organized by 6 non‐
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governmental organizations, including one Turkish organization: the Turkish
Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Aid (Eisenstaedt). In
reality, much of the mission of the Free Gaza Flotilla was an attempt to draw
negative attention to Israel. Ultimately, Israeli soldiers boarded the boats, which
resulted in the death of eight Turks and one Turkish‐American. Defense Minister
Ehud Barak proclaimed that the flotilla was a “provocation” and that Israel acted in
the best interest of its national security (Bryant and Schleifer).
After the incident, Erdogan called the issue a massacre, and felt strongly that
Israel should face repercussions. On this note, the U.N Security Council had an
investigation; Israel failed to participate in the fact‐finding mission. The UN fact‐
finding mission found that what Israel had done was illegal under international law.
Ultimately, Turkey decided to bring back its ambassador from Israel, indefinitely.
This was a diplomatic decision that had serious implications for Turkish‐Israeli
relations (Schleifer and Bryant). It is fair to say that the flotilla event and the
subsequent diplomatic actions that Turkey took mark a true turn in Turkish‐Israeli
relations.
Turkish foreign policy towards Israel has remained fairly stable up until
recent times. Ataturk’s hope for the Turkish nation was Western‐oriented.
Throughout the twentieth century Turkey has worked towards strengthening its
relations with Israel. Alongside this foreign policy initiative, Israeli‐Turkish
relations appeared to have grown. However, once the AKP party took control in
2002, a downward spiral began to be seen in Turkish‐Israeli relations, culminating
with the flotilla incident. Only time will tell what will come of the relations;
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however, the hope for the once resilient relationship of the peripheral nations in the
region is fading quickly.
The change in the relationship affects the two nations, Turkey and Israel,
differently within the realm of Middle East. Through the next chapters, the costs and
benefits for both Israel and Turkey will be analyzed. Ultimately, the chapters will
present why in fact it is important that there is a loss of relation. Although the loss of
diplomatic relations does not yield any winner, Israel will come out with the most
losses. Finally, there is an inkling of hope through this situation, and the concluding
chapter will reflect the potential in regaining relations between the two nation.
There is a lot of political diplomacy needed, and changes to the current
circumstances, in order for this to hold true. However, it does exist. The declining
Israeli‐Turkish relations are significant not only to the two nations, but to the
greater Middle East, and the subsequent chapters explain why this is so, and how it
may be possible to mend it.
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Chapter 2: An Israeli Perspective
Turkey and Israel are currently going through a rough patch in their
historical ties. This prompts an important question: if the two proceed with a
divorce, what ramifications will this have on Turkey and Israel respectively? The
facts have shown a downward pattern in their relations, and the chances of a
directional shift, with the AKP in power and a right‐leaning Knesset in Israel, are not
likely. This decline has serious implications for Israel’s national security and there
are a lot of opportunities for Israel to have major losses. Given its location relative to
its neighbors in the region, Israel will have harsher struggles without its alliance of
Turkey. However, there is a chance for a different relationship to develop, and this is
one between Israel and the Balkans.
Historically, security issues have been looked at from a literal, realist stance.
In other words, the military capabilities of the country were juxtaposed to those of
the country’s enemies, and from this the safety and security of the nation could be
evaluated. The battlefield was literal, and the way to win wars was through weapons
and military power. Currently, there is a trend throughout the world toward re‐
defining the “battlefield”. As Mor describes, what is created is the modern battlefield
(157). This is applicable for all nations, not just the state of Israel.
With increased access to and reliance on new forms of technology, a new
plane in international conflict has been realized. Images and emotional sentiment
among the general public of a given society have become more relevant than before,
and are a critical aspect of modern day warfare. The increase in media coverage of
wars, for example the Iraq war, and individual access to media, most notably the
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internet, have provided for public relations wars, which all governments must
address. It is not enough anymore to have more ammunition than the enemy, but
rather one must effectively reach out to people of other nations and win them over,
so to speak.
Israel is not exempt from the modern battlefield, and furthermore, one could
apply a theory of grand strategy to the case of Israel to further understand the
ramifications of the decline in Turkish‐Israeli relations, and how it affects the state
of Israel. Grand Strategy is utilizing domestic and foreign resources both militarily
and politically in nature, in order to achieve a sustainable national security (Ben
Mor 159). Keeping in mind that the military still plays a major role in international
security, there are three important components in this conception of national
security. The first component involves understanding the limited national resources
a nation has to achieve security. Second, the nation must attain and maintain allies.
Lastly a nation must be able to keep what Mor describes as “national morale and
political culture”; in other words, the general public is a key factor in Grand Strategy
(Mor 159). Thinking outside of the historical security box is what can allow nations
to keep safe in the modern world of you‐tube and Google, where every mistake has
the potential to be global.
Looking first from a traditional standpoint of national security, there are
serious military threats to Israel from its surrounding neighbors, and without the
support and backing of Turkey, Israel will struggle in the region. Surrounding
countries, including Iran and Syria, and their relationships with Hezbollah, pose a
threat. Another aspect to examine is the internal problems facing Israeli security in
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Gaza with Hamas. These relationships are affected by Turkey’s relationship with the
respective governments and the changing relationship between Turkey and Israel.
Understanding these threats also is relevant to grand strategy because it allows one
to evaluate what it is that needs to be portrayed both nationally and internationally
in order to achieve the goals of the grand strategy.
Iran arguably poses one of the greatest and most existential threats to Israel
in the region, and with the decline of the relations between Turkey and Israel, the
threat will increase. Only time will tell what the depth of the Iran threat is with
regard to Israel; however, until then many believe that the threat must be taken
seriously. A nuclear empowered Iran will prove even more threatening. Having
taken a step away from Israel, Turkey is taking a leap forward with its ties to Iran,
and this is a huge loss for Israel.
The leaders of Iran and some of the general public have produced
questionable and frankly frightening remarks about the West, and more specifically
Israel. Most drastically, Iran has threatened that Israel should be “wiped off the
map” (BBC News). Iran’s stance is anti‐Western, anti‐American and anti‐Israel. This
sentiment has penetrated throughout the government, so far that one author
describes that during a soccer game in Iran, once the home team scored a goal, in
celebration fans shouted “death to America, Death to Israel” (Maghen 11).
Furthermore, Ahmadinejad, the semi‐democratically 3 elected president, has
continuously denied the Holocaust and Israel’s right to exist in public. As Maghen
The system of government in Iran is semi‐democratic, There is a Supreme Leader
and Council of Guardians which are chosen religiously, and then there is a president
and a parliament which are chosen democratically, but must be approved by the
Supreme Leader.
3
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argues, during his presidency Iran’s portrayal of and stance on Israel have become
more radical and severe (Maghen 11‐13). With this kind of language, it is evident
there exists conflict between Israel and Iran, and understanding the root of the
conflict is not a simple task.
As Maghen explains, the conflict between Iran and Israel is not rational.
There is no territorial threat between each country for the two countries do not
border each other, and therefore it is not due to territory issues. The two do not
compete on an economic level; thus, it is not based upon a financial conflict.
Therefore, it is not much of a tangible contestation between the two nations, making
it less rational. It is a conflict based upon ideology: the two clash over Israel existing
as a Jewish state. Even more importantly, it is a clash over Western ideology
(Meghan 11‐13). Israel is an extension of the West and an “easy” target, which it
therefore receives a lot of attention for.
The irrationality of this type of argument is derived from the solution. It is
extremely difficult to eradicate an ideology. However, there is a rational explanation
of the contestations between Iran and Israel at some level that must be mentioned.
As the BBC mentions, in 2005 Iran’s viciously anti‐Israel rhetoric increased
immensely in the 1990’s with developments in the Palestinian issue and the Israeli
occupation of Palestinian land. This is a major reason as to why there is a conflict
between Iran and Israel. Thus, the conflict may be clear to explain; however, it is
extremely hard to solve, and the attempt to fight ideologies can become a dangerous
battle.
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Iran, together with its allies, sees Israel as a realistic target. This is based
upon an ideology in which the end goal is to strike against the West, and the United
States. In a realistic sense, there is no possibility that Iran will be able to destroy the
United States; however, Israel allows for different possibilities. Israel is close in
proximity, and surrounded by potential allies of Iran. With this type of thought,
statements made by Iran against Israel carry a lot more weight and threat (Maghen
14‐17). Harming Israel would be seen both as a victory against the West, and a
victory over a Jewish state.
To Israeli leaders, the threat of Iran exists. However, As far as Israelis are
concerned, at this point they have the military capability to strike back (Ben‐Meir
62). The real threat arises when nuclear weapons are added to the equation. An Iran
with nuclear weapons is a direct threat to Israeli national security and Iran is trying
to create such a situation. Iran’s past critiques and accusations against Israel
indicate a warning flag to Israel.
There are scholars who believe that the existence of two nuclear powers in
the region, Israel and Iran, will lead to a state of deterrence from both sides, in
which neither side will fire an attack because of mutually assured destruction. In
other words, the consequences of releasing a nuclear bomb onto the other country
would prove to be too great for either country to use this military tactic. This theory
explains why during the Cold War, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union
launched a nuclear attack.
Yet very few political scholars in Israel believe that Israel can exist with a
nuclear Iran. There are a small number of people who believe that Israel should
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check its public ambiguity regarding its own nuclear capabilities at the door, and
openly express what it possesses to Iran. One philosopher, Avner Cohen has argued
to create a transparent nuclear Israel for the sake of its democracy, for this issue has
created an extremely secretive national environment. Moreover, Cohen believes that
Israel has earned the right to openly discuss its nuclear program within the Arab
community, including what would be its second strike capability, red lines which
would help deter other nations from formulating an attack on Israel (Ephron). Other
scholars in this group of thought feel that Israel is not necessarily Iran’s main target
and that other regional instabilities, for example, Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan, are
more of Iran’s focus. This view is by no means the dominant stance, and in fact,
there are no political parties in Israel that accept this view (Ben Meir 65). Therefore,
though some in Israel believe that the two states could coexist with the presence of
a nuclear capable Iran, this has no leverage on Israel’s official national stance.
Not only is a nuclear Iran a direct threat to Israel, but also many Arab
countries have an anxiety that surrounds the concept of a nuclear Iran because if in
fact it does become nuclear capable, un‐natural allies would be forced. Saudi Arabia
has expressed much concern about a nuclear Iran and would rather have a prior
incident where Israel takes military actions against Iran, than have Iran be
successful in its plans. The Saudis have gone as far as to offer countries like China
and Russia, who have been giving aid to Iran, financial incentives to stop giving Iran
help (Ben‐Meir 69). Saudi Arabia’s concern has a modern context 4 , but stems from a
Iran’s influence in Lebanon and connection to Hezbollah undermines Saudi aid in
the country, and in Israel Iran supports Hamas, while Saudi Arabia has been giving
its support to Palestinian Authority (PA). The two nations are constantly clashing.
4

36
historical balance of power in the region, between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Nuclear
power in the region would tilt the balance of power against the Saudis (Teitelbaum
38).
Due to the change in Iran’s policy towards obtaining nuclear weapons, the
general attitude of the UN and many of the countries that make up the UN has
dramatically shifted (Ben‐Meir 67). Considering that not only Israel is at risk with a
nuclear Iran, but also that it would affect many Arab nations, and the West, an
Obama‐backed UN is talking about a fourth set of economic sanctions against Iran
(Dreyfuss 15). The idea is to use this as a political gesture towards Iran, indicating
the Western disapproval. The state of Israel supports these sanctions, and believes
that even harsher sanctions are appropriate. The fact is that Israel needs the UN and
the United States in particular for support; thus, it will accept the sanctions, while
trying to increase the severity of them.
The sanctions have been accepted by many UN nations; however, many
countries have acted to undermine these sanctions. Russia, for example, has given
aid in the form of nuclear technology to the Iranians (Ben‐Meir 67‐68). Turkey,
along with Brazil, has actively has opposed the sanctions placed upon Iran. In fact
the Turkish government in 2010 signed a 25 billion dollar deal with Iran,
considering the two countries “trading partners.” Part of this agreement includes
four nuclear plants that are supposed to be built in Iran, which would lead to energy
trade between Turkey and Iran. This is in anticipation of a stronger and long lasting
relationship between Ankara and Tehran (Conn 3).
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With thoughts other than America, the UN, and Israeli interests in mind,
Turkey is stepping out of what would be a comfort zone, particularly for Israel.
Insofar as Turkey defies the UN sanctions, it implies to Israel where its loyalty is
directed. Ultimately, Turkey is interested in its own internal security issues, and the
government of Turkey feels diplomacy, not sanctions, is in its best interest (Ustun
21). With a decline in relations between Israel and Turkey, it is not likely that Israel
will be swayed by Turkey’s conceptions of its self‐ interest in the near future.
As previously stated, the Turkish direction in foreign policy has historically
had a Western direction. However, in recent years, with the rise of the AKP, Turkey
has started to look eastward to develop ties in its own region. Its relationship with
Iran is a prime example of this, and this has implications for Israel. Turkey has a
desire to strengthen its relationship with Iran, and it has attempted to do so with
Syria as well. Turkey’s lack of acceptance of the sanctions on Iran, regardless of the
intent, is seen as a fundamentally anti‐Western and anti‐American gesture (Ustun
24).
Considering that Israel and the U.S. have both accepted and advocate for the
UN sanctions, Turkey’s stance is not seen as solely an anti‐UN gesture. It can be
viewed as an anti‐Israeli gesture as well, and adds to the evidence that there is a
decline in relations between Jerusalem and Ankara. This loss, or in the Turkish
perspective a foreign policy shift, has provided an atmosphere in which Turkey is
able to create its own agenda. Its interest in the region overrides any concerns that
the sanctions would be a positive thing for Israel (Ustun 24). It is unclear if Turkey
ever had this type of loyalty to Israel, but regardless, what is important is that there
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is no sign that this type of relationship will form. Israel needs an ally in the region
that will support it unconditionally, as the United States has historically done, and
with the decline in the relations, hopes of a close alliance with Turkey are fading
quickly.
As far as Israel is concerned, from a practical standpoint, Turkey’s alliance
with Iran is dangerous from a traditional strategic point of view. Throughout the
history of the Israeli Turkish relation there was a strong link between relations and
military support. The fact is that much of the relationship was based upon military
exchanges, and this creates fright within the Israeli government due to current
Turkish Alliance with Iran. There was information shared between Israel and
Turkey that could be placed into the hands of Iran, whose president calls for the
destruction of Israel. The threat is there, however, the severity of this type of threat
is unclear, in the sense that the amount of information shared between Israel and
Turkey is not known.
As an article from Turkish Weekly states, Israel has a fear that some of its
military secrets will be leaked to Iran, ultimately jeopardizing its existence as a state
(Tilting the Turkey‐Israel US Triangle). This appears to be a legitimate fear; much is
left unknown to public knowledge. The exact number of military secrets that were
shared between Israel and Turkey is not clear, and how much damage those secrets
can cause Israel is also ambiguous. However, this hesitation stems from a loss Israel
has faced due to the decline of Turkish‐Israeli relations, the loss of trust and
confidence in a neighboring nation.
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Furthermore, not only is there a lack of confidence between Jerusalem and
Ankara, but also there may be a boost in the confidence between Tehran and
Ankara, which could be detrimental to Israel, considering Iran’s beliefs towards
Israel. It must be noted that officially Turkey does not want a nuclear Iran; however,
it believes that diplomacy is the best way to achieve this. If Iran does achieve
nuclear warfare capability, as it wishes to, however, it will be elevated to a position
of hegemony in the region (Ben‐Meir 64). With this position, Turkey will most likely
pursue stronger relations to maintain its power in the region.
Even though according to the Turkish Weekly military arrangements between
Israel and Turkey will proceed as planned, Israel may have suffered an economic
loss. Although Israel and Turkey have maintained military exchange publicly, in
private Israeli business have become more reluctant to sell military equipment to
Turkey. This is not to say that the political unrest between Turkey and Israel have
had drastic economic repercussions to Israel, but there is a residue of economic
drawback due to the decline in relations (Turkey’s Military Programs With Israel
Remain). Moreover, the stronger Turkish‐Iranian economic ties become, with
nuclear plants included between Turkey and Iran, it should be expected that the
relationship that was once with Israel would decline further. Israel had failed to
reciprocate business opportunities in Jerusalem, as Turkey did for Israeli businesses
in Ankara when the initial relations begin to expand. If Turkish and Iranian relations
proceed perfectly, there may be implications for Israeli business in Turkey.
The loss in the region for Israel is not solely dictated by the Iran‐Israel‐
Turkish relationship. A fourth party, Syria, adds stress, post‐flotilla incident, in the
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realm of foreign relations for the West, and specifically Israel. Turkey is a strong
regional power, and with the AKP is trying to make strong connections in the region
(Maruskin 447). Syria and Iran are adamant enemies of Israel, and have appeared as
such for much time. Turkey has a strong desire for peace in the region, and its
actions try to stress this (Marukin 448). Turkey has historically tried to aid in a
peace process between Israel and Syria, in order to create a more stable region.
Along with the decline of relations with Israel, when Turkey sides with Iran
regarding UN sanctions, the chances that Turkey will continue to play the role of
mediator in the Israel‐Syria peace process are slim (Saltoff, The Gaza Flotilla
Incident).
Syria and Israel are bordering countries and have had an ongoing conflict,
which is part of the larger Arab‐Israeli conflict. The conflict between the two nations
stems partially from land and water territory disputes in an area called the Golan
Heights 5 . From Israel’s perspective, the Golan Heights and much of the Jordan River,
and ideally the Tiberius Lake, would be included in the Land of Israel. The water
issue is a very important one to Israel. More than 40 percent of the country is desert,
and there are constant water shortages. Thus, the more water bodies it has, the
better off the nation is.
Israel captured the land that is disputed during the 1967 War, and there has
been a disagreement revolving around the land up until the present day (Benn). The
In this area lie the Jordan River, and Lake Tiberius, which accounts for about 40
percent of Israel’s fresh water source as of 2001 (Slater 97). There has been a
continual struggle, that was present since 1948, and the Arab‐Israeli war. The area
received a lot of attention during the 1967 War as well, and the boards/borders? are
in constant dispute between the two countries (Slater, Lost Opportunities for
Peace).
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issue between Syria and Israel, as far as the Golan Heights is concerned, is one of
nationalism as well (Slater 80). There are slogans throughout Israel, as well as t‐
shirts that are sold and worn that proclaim that the Golan is ours. However, as Slater
explains, there have been many failed negotiations between Israel and Syria, which
Turkey has attempted to aid in. Both nations have legitimate claims to the land, and
it will take some good diplomacy in order to properly and fairly conduct a
negotiation. Ankara has been attempting to take on this role, which brings a point of
contestation with Turkey. Erdogan’s government had been trying to mediate
negotiations between Israel and Syria. In the meantime, Israeli‐Palestinian conflicts
had been growing, which infuriated the AKP, because it believed that Israeli
oppression of Palestinians and constant forceful contact hindered Turkey’s ability to
mediate between Israel and Syria.
The grievances that Israel has with Syria are not limited to the land disputes
in the north. Rather, the Syrian government is suspected to have supported nation‐
states and terrorist organizations that directly threaten the well being of the state of
Israel. First, the country has increased its dependency on Iran as an ally. However,
even more dangerous to Israeli national security, while Iran has provided economic
aid, Syria has provided military aid to Hezbollah (Soreson 112). Syria is not a super
power in the region; however, it has had political leverage in Lebanon. Thus, in
order maintain its power, it has supported a terrorist organization that is the enemy
to Israel (Soreson 113).
Turkish Foreign Minster Ahmet Davutoglu has stated that he and Turkey will
do all they can to start informal negotiations on both sides of the issue (Turkish Fm:
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Turkey Ready to Reconcile Syria and Israel). Ideally, Turkey will be able to talk to
both sides. The issue with Turkish‐aided negotiations between Israel and Syria is
the evident ties both Syria and Turkey have to Iran (Satloff, The Gaza Flotilla
Incident). This alliance is described as the “Northern Alliance” between Iran, Turkey,
and Syria with a possibility of the fourth leg to this alliance being Hezbollah (Satloff).
Considering this Northern Alliance, regardless of the intention of Turkey to
prevent a nuclear capable Iran, this situation would not sit well, and does not sit
well, with Israeli officials. Syria and Iran are the biggest enemies to Israel, aiding a
terrorist group whose goals including getting rid of the State of Israel, and Israel is
expected to trust Turkey in negotiations. Satloff reports that Israel’s confidence level
in Turkey is low. The further declining relationship, which has left Israel unsure in
other areas, further adds to the lack of confidence Israel has in Turkey’s ability to
mediate relations. Statements out of Ankara have said that there will be no stability
with Israel until Israel apologizes for the incident on the Mavi Marmara boat in May
2010. In fact, Israeli minster of Defense, Ehud Barak, stands by the country’s actions
against the flotilla event. Due to Barak’s position, a formal apology from Israel
should not be expected. The stubbornness from both sides fails to provide a
promising outlook for Syrian‐ Israeli peace talks.
Even though Turkey is willing to do what it can for Israel and it has shown its
will through economic ties and political dialogue, the reality is that it may not be
possible any more (Journal of Turkish Weekly: Turkey to do Everything It can for
Israel‐Syria Peace). Strong ties between Ankara and Jerusalem may prove to be a
prerequisite for proper peace talks between Israel and Syria, and due to the decline
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in relations, Israel may not be able to achieve it. In fact, part of the cause for the
decline in relations between Israel and Turkey is the reason for the breakdown of
the talks between Damascus and Jerusalem. The offense launched by Israel in 2008
against Hamas in the Gaza Strip because of a reaction to rockets fired at Israel by
Hamas signaled the end of talks (Turkish FM: Turkey Ready to Reconcile Syria and
Israel).
It is clear that Turkey does not support the hardliner views of Ahmadinjad,
and Hezbollah, for Ankara has released multiple statements that it does not desire a
nuclear able Iran. Davutoglu has said, ”We do not want any countries to own nuclear
weapons in our region, and we want solution of Iran’s nuclear problem through
diplomacy” (Turkey to Do Everything It Can for Israeli‐Syria Peace). The message is
clear, however, that when Ankara’s policies and Jerusalem’s policies collide, there is
a negative effect on Israel, especially when it comes to Hamas. Inconsistencies
between Israel and the Abbas‐ led Palestinian Authority and Turkey’s policy on
Hamas are another setback to Israel in the failing Turkey‐Israeli relationship.
First of all, when President Gul met with the top official of Hamas, he was
ignoring the hardliner, aggressive, anti‐Israel fundamentals of the organization that
would scare most nations. “Turkey has embraced the leaders of Iran and Hamas, all
of whom called for Israel’s destruction’ Ambassador Michael Oren declared”
(Krieger, Turkey has Embraced). This is validated by the ideology and foundation of
Hamas. Hamas was elected in 2006, and thus gained control of the Gaza Strip. It was
once part of the Palestinian Authority (PA), which included other political groups as
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well. Hamas failed to recognize the state of Israel, there was a split in the
organization, and Hamas was no longer part of the PA.
The language that is present in Hamas’s 1988 charter is racist and harsh. For
example, a passage in article seven reads, “The time will not come until Muslims
fight the Jews (and kill them); until the Jews hide behind rocks and trees, which will
cry O Muslim! There is a Jew hiding behind me, come on and kill him!” (Alexander
51). Other passages are less vulgar; however, they show no sign of flexibility. An
example is in article thirteen of the charter, which states, “there is no solution to the
Palestinian problem except by Jihad” (Alexander 55). This charter remains a strong
point of contention for Israel, and the West.
After establishing itself as an organization, Hamas created its 1988 charter
that declares its hardliner goals. Later, scholars would argue that Hamas does not
stand by its charter, but the fact is that this document was created and that calls for
attention. The charter calls for the destruction of the state of Israel, and denies its
right to exist. It claims that there must be Islamic control of Jerusalem, the third
holiest city to Islam. Subsequently, it believes that the land Israel is occupying is
considered an Islamic waqf 6 and should be returned back to its rightful owners: the
Palestinians, and more specifically Muslims. As far as Hamas is concerned, Israeli
control of this land is not an attack directed towards the Palestinian people, but
rather, an attack directed towards all of Islam (Gunning 199‐200).
Not only is Hamas a physical threat to Israel, it will also be argued that
engaging Hamas is detrimental for the Palestinian‐Israeli peace process, and is
6

Islamic holy site
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therefore negative for Israelis and Palestinians alike. This is an extremely sensitive
situation in which Ankara’s policies have been at a cross purpose to Israel’s policies.
Hamas would accept a Hudna 7 ; a Hudna may not be a never‐ending contract. It can
range from as short as one month to as long as ten years, as long as it has a temporal
limit. There is no long term peace, nor is there any security in a truce, for it could be
nullified at any moment (Abu‐Irshaid and Scham 9‐10). Therefore, with this type of
solution, a long lasting peace is not attainable.
There are many scholars who argue that the 1988 charter of Hamas is
outdated, and that in fact there are new documents from the organization whose
words are much more favorable. Furthermore, they argue, Hamas is not a Western
political unit, and is accustomed to different ways of communicating. Non‐Western
Hamas is much more subtle and indirect. One scholar proclaims that Hamas’s
election platform in 2006 shows that the emphasis of the organization is to build up
the Palestinian people as opposed to the destruction of the Israeli people (Hroub
10).
The fact that Hamas’s language has shifted in documents does not give merit
to an argument that supports engaging with Hamas at the present time. Actions
speak louder than words, and at present, the organization has been actively
attacking the civilian population. The Qassam Brigade, which is Hamas’s military
unit, partakes in terrorist activities against Israel’s civilians (Alexander 12). Even
after Israel disengaged from Gaza in 2005, Hamas continues to use terrorist
techniques against the Israeli civilians. To date, Hamas has launched about 5,700
A Hudna is Arabic for truce. Furthermore, according to Islam, a Hudna is to favor
the Muslim community, not its enemy, in this case Israel.
7
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long‐range rockets and 4,000 mortar shells onto the south of Israel, with Israeli
civilians as targets (Yanga).
After the separation of Hamas from the Palestinian Authority in 2007, Israel
has developed a policy against interaction with Hamas. At the same time, there have
been great advancements with Fatah in the West Bank (Yaghi). Israel focused much
of its efforts in the peace process on working with Fatah. The political party that
heads the West Bank had previously been the head of Fatah, and he had harsher
philosophies. The founder of Fatah, Yasser Arafat, believed that the Palestinians had
no blame, and were the most deserving in the situation. However, today, without
Arafat and with President Abbas and Prime Minister Fayyad there has been a
change in ideology. Fayyad in particular was Western educated, and believes in
emulating what Israel was able to accomplish. There is an emphasis on
infrastructure, and so when there finally is a state of Palestine, the basis of a state
will already exist (Makovsky).
With this type of intention, it has become Israel’s focus to engage Fatah, for it
has made compromises and so deserves attention. With the emergence of new
political thinking within Fatah, especially with Fayyad, Israel has been given a great
opportunity. Engagement with Hamas would jeopardize the success that has been
achieved with Fatah (Makovsky). Turkey has not proved to be sensitive to this issue
in the Palestinian Conflict, with Gul hosting a Hamas representative.
It is critical to keep Fatah in mind when Israel decides how to interact with
Hamas. It is not a tangential arrangement between Israel and Hamas; rather Fatah is
a crucial component to the peace process, and it represents approximately 2 million
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Palestinians (CIA Fact book). Abbas and Fayyad have made strides and risked much
for the prospect of peace with Israel. Fatah was willing to make sacrifices for the
sake of the Palestinian people and for Israel, and this cannot have been done in vain.
The split between Hamas and Fatah makes it clear that Israel cannot communicate
with the two simultaneously, unless the two groups reconcile on their own terms.
If Israel were to try to accommodate Hamas, when its actions have been
anything but compatible with Israel’s desires, it sends a detrimental signal. It tells
Fatah that Israel does not respect the compromises it has made. As Makovsky
described it, Israel would be telling the world that as far as it goes, “you could kill
and still be kosher” (Makovsky). Therefore, when Erdogan says “You’ll never let
Hamas rule, what kind of democracy is this?” (Krieger) it is inherently detrimental
to Israel’s efforts in pursuing peace with the Palestinians. Moreover, when Erdogan
proclaims that “Hamas is not a terrorist organization” and that “They are
Palestinians in resistance,” he is disregarding the two million other Palestinians,
who are not organized under Hamas (Krieger).
Moreover, by recognizing and engaging Hamas, the Turkish government is
further empowering Hamas, a development that may lead to a more divided
Palestinian population. This will result in a much larger conflict for Israel and the
Palestinian people. The way in which Ankara reacts to the relationship between
Hamas and Israel ultimately is a great loss for Israel. The increase in conflict
between the Israelis and Palestinians will provoke further conflict between Israel
and Turkey, enhancing the negatives for Israel.
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Thus far, the ramifications from a realistic, traditional national security
standpoint have been shown. However, arguably the greatest cost for Israel is seen
in relation to its Grand Strategy. It is not new for Israel’s approval rating, so to
speak, to be low. In fact, Mor uses Israel, and the way it conducted itself during the
second Intifada, as a prime example of what not to do. During this time, Israel had
failed to recognize that the Arab media was a tactical threat, and on its own front,
did not utilize Israeli media to counter the threat. Moreover, the minister of defense
banned all Israeli media from entering the war area. Beyond the lack of Israeli
media, there was no coherent voice to speak on behalf of Israel’s stance that they
were pro‐peace and not trying to create a war. However, foreign media was present
and was able to make a cohesive voice that spoke against Israel’s use of force,
negatively portraying Israel (Mor 167‐169).
The emphasis on one particular incident, the Jenin operation, led to a
complete failure in terms of public opinion (Mor 170‐171). Jenin was a refugee
camp during the time of the second Intifada. There was an issue as far as Israeli
national security was concerned, because it was believed that some of the most
wanted people were to be found at this refugee camp. As Mor describes, when the
IDF decided how to handle the situation, there was no thought in minimizing the
image of the military force Israel would use to the rest of the world. It was a
“Bulldozer” operation (Mor 170). In order for Israel to secure the safety of its
soldiers, it would simply destroy any house within the Jenin refugee camp that
presented a potential threat. Without the presence of Israeli media, nor the
consideration of the Israeli government to consider outside perception, Israel was
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viewed as committing a massacre in the refugee camp, which created a dreadful
image for Israel.
At the time of the second intifada a media expert from the United States
“described Israel’s PR efforts in the United States as disastrous” (Diker 4). Experts
from the United States explain that though Israel has a legitimate claim to its own
territory, it is not able to formulate a direct consistent message, and fails to address
the critical arguments made against it (Diker 4). Ten years later, the harm to the
Turkish‐Israeli alliance has facilitated an even worse public image for Israel, in
Turkey, but also in the rest of the world. This alone may be the most detrimental
loss for Israel to come from its declining relationship with Turkey. Furthermore, this
was not a loss that Israel was prepared to have.
Even before the AKP was elected into power in 2002, the Turkish media had
a lot of criticism for the State of Israel. Mainly, the criticisms were based around the
Israeli‐Palestinian conflict, and how Israel was acting as an aggressor
inappropriately. After the flotilla incident in the middle of 2010, the Turkish media
and population expressed anger, disappointment, and shock as to what had
occurred.
The critical component to a grand strategy, with an emphasis on public
relations, focuses on political gains abroad. In order to attain this, a nation must be
able to relate its situation and create a sense of empathy amongst the international
community. Israel’s actions vis‐à‐vis the flotilla, as much as Israeli Defense Minister
Ehud Barak will say that they were for self‐defense, put a damper on any empathy it
could receive (Mor 159). In Turkey, not only did the media yet again come down on
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Israel, but also it was for an attack that was committed against its own people. The
Turkish media and people were furious, and on the 31st of May there were Turkish
citizens protesting in front of the Israeli embassy in Ankara, demonstrating the
public’s rage (AA Journal of Turkish weekly)
One Turkish film in particular represents the degree to which Israel’s public
image has declined within Turkish society. This film is called “The Valley of the
Wolves: Palestine” and is a Turkish spin off of a TV series that is similar to a
“24”type show, called The Valley of the Wolves. The movie tells the tale of an
undercover agent and his quest is to find the man responsible for the flotilla raid
(Fraser). The film depicts the Israeli soldiers as aggressive, crude people, and the
scenes show Israelis as the villain. The villain of the movie says “the Arabian
population will soon outnumber ours, so we have to establish the great Israel”
(Official Trailer). Another scene shows the Turkish James Bond answering why he
came to Israel; his response is “I did not come to Israel, I came to Palestine” (Official
Trailer). Based upon this movie, which has a large cult‐like following, one article
expressed that if the “good‐guy” wins, Israel should not exist. This is a terrifying
piece of media from an Israeli perspective.
Moreover, the “Valley of Wolves: Palestine” is very likely to heighten tension
between the two countries, as an article from Today’s Zaman explains. The movie
embodies a general sentiment of anger that the Turks are experiencing due to the
2010 flotilla incident. Moreover, as a highly negative depiction of Israel, the movie
has plans to reach a large audience in Turkey: it had a 10 million Euro budget and
stems from a popular TV series (Reuters). Alongside its large budget, it has acquired
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a large cast of Turkish citizens ‐‐ men, women, and children ‐‐ as extras in the film,
who, as a New York Times article described, are ready to show the world how the
Palestinians are living (Arsu). Israeli officials are enraged by the anticipation of
what is to come from this film, and believe it to be a low point in Turkish media. At
the same time the Anti‐Defamation League 8 (ADL) has proclaimed that this is “mass
media anti‐Semitism” (Reuters). The true effects of the movie will have to wait until
the movie is aired; however, the excitement and support that the Turkish population
has given to the making of this film signifies a huge political loss for Israel, and for
the Israeli‐Turkish relationship. This support for the film indicates how at least
some of the Turkish population feels about Israel, which may make it harder for the
Turkish government to mend relations with Israel, even it wanted to do so.
Israel has not only begun losing the battle with public relations solely on the
Turkish front, but also in the United States as well. Many Americans have become
apathetic at best to the case of Israel. This notion includes the population that has
been historically most supportive of Israel and its policies, American Jewry
(Goekler). What used be the fundamentals of supporters of Israel, American Jews do
not have the same level of enthusiasm for Zionist mentality as they used to. Adding
to the equation, the way in which modern media is used allows for off‐putting Israeli
publicity to emanate through the online newspapers, blogs, and social networks of
American Jews (Goelker). “The ‘freedom flotilla’ organizers knew and took
advantage of this. The Israelis completely misunderstood it, were suckered in and

The Anti Defamation League (ADL) is an American organization focusing on how to
deal with prejudices, included in this is anti‐Semitism, and how to respond to it.
8
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are now paying the price. Not only did they look to all the world like criminals and
thugs, they also managed to look incompetent in the process” (Goelker).
More than anything else, the way in which American Jewish organizations
perceived the Gaza flotilla event measured how fractionalized American Jewry has
become. It sent one of two messages, first, as Goelker said, that it was a publicity
stunt and those on the flotilla were purposefully provoking Israelis. This view can be
seen with the American Jewish Committee (AJC). Or, there are Jewish Americans
expressing how this is an example and extension of Israeli oppression and Israel is
at fault. It is groups such as J‐street, which opposes the blockade of Gaza to begin
with, and believes that Israel does not need to be dripping with violence
(Beckerman). Juxtaposing J‐street and AJC, the clear contrast emanates the reality
that American Jews are on two different planes as far as Israel is concerned. The
flotilla incident added further separation, and Israel cannot afford to have its
support divided anymore than it already is.
The Jews that are affected by the media against Israel are in some way
predisposed to support Israel; it is after all a state for the Jews. Yet they are not
supporting Israel, and this fact should be a clear sign to Israel that it needs to take
the concept of public relations, and creating empathy for itself abroad, seriously. It is
a critical part of its struggle to maintain itself in the Middle East. Losing the public
support from Turkey is detrimental to the Israel’s positioning in the Middle East,
and amongst its neighbors. However, losing the support of the American Jews,
through critical media coverage, could potentially affect Israel’s relationship with its
biggest ally, the United States.
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The decline in relations between Turkey and Israel has created many
moments of frustration and trepidation for Israel. However, in one area, this fallout
of sorts has boosted Israel. The farther that Israel becomes from Turkey, it has
appeared the closer Israel has become with the Balkans, and especially Greece. Since
the most drastic decline in mid‐2010, there have been military ties between Israel
and the Balkans; in January of 2010 Bulgaria allowed the Israeli Air Force to use its
facilities for practice. In the case of Greece, Israeli ties have turned around
drastically. The prime ministers of Israel and Greece met earlier in 2010 (As Turkey
Front Freezes, Israel looks to warming Balkans Tie). More importantly, relations
with Turkey were a sign of social acceptance from an actor in the region and source
of pride and legitimacy (Bengio 46). With the decline of the relationship came the
decline of the ability to be proud of an alliance. Greece has taken that role for many
Israelis. It is evident in the tourism numbers, which have increased over 200
percent since before the fallout with Turkey (As Turkey Front Freezes, Israel looks
to warming Balkans Tie).
The Balkans are not in the Middle East as Turkey is, and do not hold the same
political leverage in critical conflicts, which is beneficial to Israel’s statehood, nor do
they provide the same legitimacy in the region. However, the countries are members
of the European Union, and this is a positive thing for Israel. The more allies that
Israel is able to obtain, the more likely it will be able to work on its image in the rest
of the world. The Balkan region of Europe is a perfectly good place for it to start. For
what it’s worth, if there is only one good aspect to a situation, it is what should be
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celebrated. Israel should be proud of the advancements made in this region, and
work on strengthening them further.
Looking at the overall effect that the decline of the Turkish‐Israeli
relationship has had on Israel, the results are grim. Turkey has strengthened its ties
with Iran and Syria since 2002, and both of these countries have an unsavory
relationship with Hezbollah. This is a direct threat to Israel’s national security, the
magnitude of which has only increased since the decline of its relations.
Furthermore, the way in which Turkey engages Hamas, and the lack of respect that
Fatah in effect receives as a result, has potential to increase the severity of the
Palestinian‐Israeli conflict.
What is more, not only is there an increase to national security threats, Israel
has proven itself unable to properly present itself to the rest of the world. Israel’s
public image across the globe, post‐flotilla incident, has declined, and it has not only
affected Turkey’s population. The American population, and specifically American
Jewry, has shown a decline in public support for Israel. Israel has been the largest
recipient of U.S. military aid in the globe (Davles). Thus, much of Israel’s military
success has been based upon constant aid from the Untied States, which is crucial to
Israel’s existence at this point.
The aid has partially from Jewish American lobbyists in Washington.
American Jewry during the 1930’s and 40’s created a strong Zionist movement,
which gave much support to Israel because of their insecurities as a people around
the world. Today, much of the support that American Jewry has for Israel comes
from either personal attachment, or pride in Israel. Israel is a democratic nation
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with strong ties to the United States. Many of the American Jews are those who
lobby in Washington in efforts to keep the US‐Israeli ties strong (Foxman).
This decline in alliances situation is a dangerous one, and Israel has to
realize that public opinions, and Arab propaganda, are just as much a security threat
as a nuclear Iran is. Amongst all of these losses, there is a ray of hope with
advancements of the relationship between Israel and the Balkans. Israel was able to
seize an opportunity to strengthen ties especially with Bulgaria and Greece, which
hopefully will bring political advantages to Israel and an ability to re‐evaluate how it
projects its image unto the world.
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Chapter 3: A Turkish Perspective
Turkey and Israel have been affected differently by the change in their
relations. Israel’s national security has been negatively affected overall by the
decline. On the contrary, besides a few minor consequences, Turkish foreign policy
has remained intact. In some aspects of Turkey’s foreign policy, the loss of strategic
ties between Turkey and Israel is actually beneficial. With its new foreign policies,
Turkey has made new allies in the region, separate from the Turkey‐Israeli relation.
Ultimately, Turkey may not need Israel’s alliance for an agreeable foreign policy
stance n the region.
The new foreign policy strategies in Turkey explain why Israel is less of an
advantageous alliance for Turkey, and why it has steered into new directions in the
region. Turkey has transformed itself, especially since Ahmet Davutoglu was
appointed to foreign minister. Under his leadership, and the leadership of the AKP,
Turkey has proven that its foreign agenda is independent from that of the West. The
decline of Turkish‐Israeli relations may prove to have less of significance for Turkey
than it does for Israel.
The changes to the Turkish government have been, as Bengio calls it, a “quiet
revolution” (15). The changes in foreign policy have been influenced by domestic
changes. The political elite has changed from secular Western‐oriented political elite
during the Kemalist era to a conservative and pious elite. The new elite is content
with becoming a major game changer within the Middle East. Turkey is bringing
together Islam and democracy. In order to attain its position, the AKP has had strong
political grassroots techniques, and focuses on domestic issues, which involved
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economic reform. All the while, it advances its personal agenda regarding Islam and
its interaction with the both the West and the Middle East (Bengio 15). Thus far,
Turkey has been an example for the compatibility of Islam and democracy.
Turkey’s new policies focus on becoming the soft power in the region, while
attaining inclusionary goals. These policies emphasize diplomatic power, as
opposed to military might. In order to be a soft power, it would mean Turkey would
pursue dialogue and utilize pressures that do not include military threats. Many
scholars have criticized Turkey for having contradicting views to those of NATO or
the United States. Its actions create a notion that Turkey is becoming anti‐Western.
This is not the case. Rather than choosing a side, Turkey believes it is part of an
international community, one that includes Turkey as an able power, opposed to a
problem which needs international aid (Trayb 3). There are multiple forces that
have provoked this change in Turkish foreign policy. The changes have brought
about new priorities for Turkey, and it is made clear after assessing these new
policies that Israeli‐Turkish relations are not a top priority for Turkey.
The AKP, using its current power, has recreated a strong agenda that
encompasses both foreign and domestic policies. Bengio summarizes these.
Three factors coalesced to produce a change: The ‘mind’‐the present foreign
minister, Ahmet Davutoglu; the ‘power’‐The AKP adalet ve kalkunma Partisi
[the Justice and Development Party] and its leader, Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan; and the ‘spirit’‐ideological changes that embrace large
sectors of Turkish society. (Bengio 15)

58
These changes to foreign policy are drastic turns from the previous government,
and have re‐prioritized who is valuable to Turkey as an ally. As Bengio describes in
this quote, the changes to foreign policy and re‐directing the nation’s intentions
does not stem from top‐down policy, but rather is a result of a societal change. In
fact, much of the AKP’s focus is to create a stronger democracy for Turkey, so that
the Turkey will reflect the population of the country.
Recent developments in a constitutional referendum have proved AKP’s
promise to ensure democracy throughout Turkey. Among other things, the
referendum instates that individuals who are convicted of plotting a coup against
the government will be tried in civilian courts, as opposed to military courts
(Erdagon pulls it off, The Economist). This is important because historically, much of
the political control, during times of instability, was held by the military. Turkey’s
military has been associated with the secular elite and the Kemalist ideology (Orbis
135). The change to the constitution ensures that those who were democratically
elected will be in charge of trying individuals as well.
Those against the referendum have said that it is a step in the wrong
direction for secular Turkey. Part of the package that was passed allows for greater
Parliamentary and Presidential control over appointments in the judiciary sectors of
government. Many in opposition to the AKP are concerned that Erdagon and his
government will use this tool in order to choose individuals with hard‐liner, non‐
secular ideology to fill these positions (Erdagon pulls it off, The Economist).
However, this action should be seen as an advancement in Turkish democracy. It
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will hopefully show to the world that Islam and democracy can and will coexist. This
referendum marks a change in the political picture of Turkey.
Ahmet Davutoglu is the man behind the party who has transformed foreign
policy in Turkey over the past two years. He has been one of Erdogan’s closest
advisors since 2003, and Erdogan appointed him foreign minister on May 1st 2009.
Turkey has always played a balancing act between the West and the East and
Davutoglu’s foreign policy stance reflects a conscious effort to re‐evaluate this
situation. Through Davutoglu’s philosophy and his character in foreign policy, he is
attempting to restructure Turkish foreign policy in efforts to rejuvenate it (Ara 14).
These changes have an effect on the way in which Turkey reacts to all actors in the
international community, and especially how it reacts to Israel.
Davutoglu, as a philosopher and scholar, has a foreign policy dripping in
rhetoric, with one phrase resonating loudest: “zero problem relations”(Duzgit and
Tocci). Due to Turkey’s geopolitical situation, this a hard task to accomplish.
Considering that the neighboring countries include Iran and Syria, the goal of no
conflict seems to be a challenge. However, given that this is the adopted policy, there
is anticipation for future action. Once Davutoglu took power, Turkey adopted a
peacemaking role in the Middle East (Traub 6). Turkey, under the leadership of the
AKP, is interested in creating a global community, as opposed to being the hegemon
of the Middle East.
In order to uphold Davutoglu’s words and intention, he has key components
to his foreign policies that will take Turkey from rhetoric to action. First, there is a
component of adaptability that is calculated into foreign policy making (Aras 8).
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What this entails is accounting for changes in foreign policy priorities; in other
words, Turkey must be pliable in reacting to new advancements in the global
community. As Aras describes, the goal is to focus on “strategic depth” in the region.
A variety of strategic partners are necessary for a healthy foreign policy (8). Turkey
must seize any opportunity in terms of foreign relations and give the proper
attention to any issue that arises.
Second, in order to attain a zero‐problem outcome, Turkey must be on
constant search for peacekeeping initiatives within the international community.
This is what Aras calls a “proactive” aspect to Turkish foreign policy (9). Davutoglu
believes that prior to establishing this as a foreign policy concern, Turkey had failed
to exert itself in crucial international communities such as the Organization of the
Islamic Conference (OIC) 9 . Turkey did not present a candidate for a judge in OIC, for
example. With the new foci in foreign policy, this track record has been changing,
and Turkey now has a non‐permanent seat on the UN Security Council (Aras 9).
Davutoglu also believes that in order to attain ideal foreign policy, Turkey
must be on the ground when an international crisis arises (Aras 9). There should be
no bias when sending aid to a country in crisis. 10 Rather, Turkey should be ready to
respond to various needs. Whether in Europe or the Middle East, good foreign policy
means that Turkey will be readily available for all crises.
The last piece of Davutoglu’s policies incorporates inclusiveness within the
international community, keeping in mind that non‐state actors have a role in policy
It is the second largest inter‐governmental organization, made up of 57 countries,
similar to the United Nations.
10 This does hold true with Israel‐Turkish relations. In the fires in the North of Israel
in December 2010, Turkey was one of the first nations to send aid to Israel.
9

61
making as well (Aras 9‐10). This inclusiveness means all “real” actors not only state
actor. Rather, all politicized groups have an equal voice as far as the AKP is
concerned. This stretches to include industries, NGOs and other social groups that
could influence foreign policy (Aras 10).
This philosophy has been realized with the inclusion of both HAMAS and
Hezbollah into Ankara’s political circle. Turkey is committed to engage both of these
organizations (Aras 10). In addition Ankara has strengthened ties with many
unsavory governments, from a Western standpoint. These regimes include Sudan,
Syria, Iran, and Libya (Orbis 136). Relations with some of these countries have a
strong strategic purpose, and enhance Turkey’s zero‐problem zone. With this
political philosophy in mind, there is a needed explanation then as to why Israel has
been so brutally criticized by Erdagon and his government.
Much of the theoretical policies which Davutoglu stresses are not inherently
anti‐Western, and he constantly stresses that Turkey has no intention of turning its
back on the West. Turkey strives to be part of the global community (Traub 5‐6).
However, the implications of Turkey’s actions have been perceived as anti‐Western.
More specifically, more than anti‐Western, many of these actions have proven anti‐
Israel.
Looking from a strictly theoretical standpoint, based upon Turkey’s new
foreign policy, it would not be expected that Turkey and Israel’s relationship would
deteriorate at the rate that it has. The adaptability factor in the foreign policy
explains how Israel, once a critical strategic ally to Turkey, was able to lose its
importance in Turkish foreign policy. Even though Israel’s importance has declined,
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a large part of the Turkish policies still aims at inclusion of all actors, while creating
an influence on the land. Israel is apparently an exception to this policy. Turkey
removed its ambassador to Turkey from Tel Aviv, creating an interesting
interpretation of this new foreign policy plan.
Historically, Turkey has been on the outside of Middle East politics, which is
what originally united Turkey and Israel. Turkey was secular and tried to become
accepted as a part of the West throughout much of its early history. Present day
Turkey has made efforts to Middle Easternize, so to speak (Oguzlu). The AKP uses
Islam as a unifying factor in the region in order to gain the support of Arab countries
(Oguzlu 14). Gaining these new strategic partners reduces the importance of the
Israel as Turkey’s historical partner. Furthermore it may prove beneficial for Turkey
to distant itself from Israel, in light of its new strategic relationships.
Two of the newest Turkish partners in the international arena are Syria and
Iran. From the perspective of the United States and Israel, it is puzzling why Turkey
insists on strengthening its ties with these two nations. The two countries have
connections to the terrorist organization, Hezbollah, and have aggressively negative
views of Israel and the United States. However, both nations have a strategic
significance and play an important role in Turkey’s national security. With an
understanding of Davutoglu’s foreign policy stance, which emphasizes inclusion, it is
evident that these nations are important to be included in Turkish foreign policy,
especially considering that Turkey feels excluded from Europe.
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Iran’s value to Turkey rests upon one of the most important issues around
the world: energy. Iran is the second largest provider of natural gases to Turkey 11
(Larrabee 108). Moreover, there have been initiatives between the two nations that
allow for a Turkish company, Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO), to use Iran to
explore its land. It then brings oil and natural gases back through a pipeline to
Turkey (Larrabee 108). Together with Brazil, Iran and Turkey have entered an
agreement that consists of uranium exchange that takes place in Turkey
(Migdalovitz 28). They signed an agreement that entails the exchange of 1,200
kilograms of low‐enriched uranium 12 . The deal was approved as a result of a 19‐
hour talk between Brazil’s former president, Luiz Inacio Lula de Sevilla, Iranian
President Ahmadinejad, and Prime Minister Erdogan (word rss). The agreement
defies the UN economic sanction against Iran. Aside from the agreement with Brazil,
Davutoglu has met with Saeed Jalili, the secretary of Iran’s Supreme National
Security Council (SNSC) in Tehran, and expressed Turkey’s support of Iran’s
peaceful nuclear program (Inbar 143). These actions reveal Turkey’s reliance on
Iran for energy trade, as well a public encouragement for Iranian policies.
Defying the international community and creating a separate agreement with
Iran and Brazil indicates the AKP’s intentions within the Middle East. In fact, there
has been “400‐year peace and stability on the Iranian‐Turkish Border” (Turkish‐
Iranian Relations and Recent Developments in the Region). However, the
importance is deeper than history. The two nations are both Muslim non‐Arab
The largest provider of energy to Turkey is Russia.
The level of uranium that was relevant to the sanctions is 20 percent enriched
uranium, which means that 20 percent of the uranium atoms are unstable. In
comparison, weapon‐grade uranium is 90 percent enriched.

11
12
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actors in the region, which is more substantial than the bond shared between Israel
and Turkey. These ties must be important to the future of foreign policy, and
indicative of its direction, or it would not try to have it come between itself and the
West.
Iran has become a strategic partner to Turkey. The two nations are both
members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), and are fellow
members of the Developing 8 (D‐8). Both are inter‐governmental groups, with an
emphasis on Muslim countries unifying together (Inbar 139). Moreover, Turkey
abstained from voting against Iran while sitting on the UN International Atomic
Energy Agency, standing by its philosophy that Iran should be allowed a proper
peaceful nuclear energy development program (Inbar 130). With more
opportunities for diplomacy, Iran is a top priority for Turkish foreign policy.
Iran is a factor when considering the changing relations between Israel and
Turkey. Iran can offer more to Turkey politically than Israel can. For one, Israel does
not have the same capability for energy trade. Secondly, Iran is in fact becoming
increasingly important to Turkey, therefore its own opinion of Israel matters. Israel
and Iran have clashing politics. It is advantageous for Turkish policies with Iran to
create anti‐Israeli rhetoric; therefore, its relationship with its new strategic ally can
become stronger.
Turkey and Syria had a clash of interests in the 1990s because of how Syria
handled the Kurdish Issue. Turkey felt as though Syria did not comply with its own
policies, feeling as though Syria sided with the Kurdish population. In the 1990s
Syria’s lack of compliance with the Kurdish problem had created frustrations
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between the two countries. However, recently, Syria and Turkey have strengthened
ties. As stated in previous chapters, as a result of the Iraq War, Turkey had increased
diplomacy with Syria for national security Interests. The northern alliance, between
Syria, Iran and Turkey has also been taking form. In the 1990’s Turkey had worked
towards friendly relations with the entire region, both east and west of Turkey so
that it could be considered part of the EU. Syria was part of this attitude towards
foreign relations. By 2009, Turkey and Syria had partaken in a few small military
operations together, yet Turkey’s membership in NATO hindered completely
invested military operations between the two nations.
An addition to the new Turkish‐Syrian alliance is the massive amount that
Turkey exports into Syria, which amounts to 1.4 billion dollars yearly
(Heydarian).Turkey’s increasing alliance with Iran and Iran’s alliance with Syria
explains the importance of Syrian‐Turkish relations. Much of the increase in
relations between the two nations has stemmed from initiatives from Damascus, as
opposed to Ankara. Syria is worried now about its own Kurdish minority and has
turned to Turkey for aid (Larrabee 109). Syria and Israel represent another spot of
contestation. Thus, with the recent ties to Syria, Turkey has reason to shift away
from strong ties with the Israeli government.
Turkey has created a strategic relationship with many surrounding
countries, Russia, Armenia, and Sudan (which will be further discussed later) in
order to attain the control of soft power in the region. The bulk of the foreign policy
Davutoglu presents and instills into the nation revolves around Turkey’s ability to
be a soft power in the region (Bengio 17)

66
Turkey’s new attitude towards the international arena has already enabled it
to make strides as the soft power of the Middle East. It hopes to take these
achievements to the rest of the world as well. For example, Turkey was successful in
creating a visa‐free zone between Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. This will
create moves towards a free trade zone between these nations. It will help the
markets of all nations, and help them work towards becoming more dominant
economic players.
While Turkey strives to reach out to its Arab neighbors, it is critical of its
relations with Israel. Davutoglu’s earlier writing had explicitly stated that ties with
Israel have prevented Turkey from creating proper relations with its Arab
neighbors (Bengio 17). In terms of the large political picture, Turkey may see Israel
as an obstacle, in which case, the decline of the relations between the two nations
would be politically valuable for Turkey. Bengio states, “Israel did not fit into the
grand strategy of opening up to the countries of the region for ideological and
economic interests” (18). With new advancements in their relations, Turkey has the
liberty to engage with its Arab neighbors without the stigma of being associated
with Israel.
Moreover, scholars will argue that the decline in the relationship between
Israel and Turkey in recent years is a positive thing for Turkish foreign affairs in
general. “Turco‐Israeli Alliance in the region has potential hatred from some of the
regional countries towards Turkey” (Erdemir 31). Just as Turkey’s involvement
with the West has some implications in the region, so too does its involvement with
Israel. Therefore, when its relations with Iran, Syria, and other political alliances are
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put in jeopardy, it will sacrifice its relationship with Israel first. This stems back to
the adaptability part of the new Turkish foreign policy. It must make adjustments to
its priorities, not remain static.
Many of these nations have negative views of Israel, and Turkey’s recent
remarks about Israel will prove to these nations where its loyalties lie. A prime
example is Turkey’s reaction in January of 2009, after Israel’s military campaign
against Gaza from December 2008‐January 2009. Erdogan had released a statement
in which he said to Shimon Peres, the president of Israel, that Israel killed people
(Migdalovitz 11). His words were plain and simple, and yet they had a strong
influence in the international community. Migdaolvitz asserts that with this attack
on Israel’s actions against Gaza, Turkey was able to impress the Arab nations (11).
Essentially, when the AKP attacks Israel it means that Turkey gains respect in the
region.
Furthermore, some scholars argue that Israel is a threat to Turkey’s national
security. It is explicit in international relations that Israel has many security threats
within the region. Turkey cannot afford to compromise its own international
security in its relationship to Israel (Edmir 33‐34). Though this is a valid argument,
in reality the Middle East is a filled with national security threat, not unique to
Israel. It is not a stable region, and Turkey’s recent policy developments focus on
mediating these issues. Furthermore, Turkey had recalled its ambassador to Israel
in the fall of 2010 (Turkish Israeli relations head to uncharted waters) Without the
ambassador of Turkey in Israel, there is a statement made towards Israel that
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Turkey does not include Israel as a necessary part of the zero‐problem policy. This
goes against part of the fundamental theories of Davutoglu’s foreign policy.
Insofar as Muslim countries are now the focus of Turkish policies, Inbar
believes that the unraveling of relations with Israel is part of the process (142). As
stated before, much of Turkey’s strategy is to increase contact with not only the
Arab nations, but with Muslim nations as well. This is seen through many inter‐
governmental organizations in which Turkey, under the AKP, is actively a part of
(Inbar, 142). This desire to unite Muslim country especially in the immediate
vicinity of Turkey leaves Israel out of the picture.
With the desire to bring Muslim nations together, the quality of the Israeli‐
Turkish relationship is not as much a concern for the Turkish government and the
AKP. This implies that deterioration of Israeli‐Turkish relations are yet again, a
positive progression for Turkey. Furthermore, Erdogan’s government views Syria,
Iran and Turkey’s relationship as a key unit to bring stability to the Middle East
(Inbar 143). On the contrary, Turkey views Israel’s policies as a threat to the
security and stability of the region (Inbar 142). Therefore, the decline in relations
for Turkey means that it can disassociate from Israel’s negative ways.
Ankara understands that some sort of diplomatic ties with Israel would be
advantageous to international relations, despite the actions and the contestations
Ankara has with Israel. As much as the decline in relations between Turkey and
Israel is beneficial for Turkey’s other relations in the region, no deterioration is
good. Inbar predicts that Turkey and Israel’s relations will retain some interaction
on the level of diplomacy and economics (145). There is a danger that if Israel‐
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Turkey relations proceed as they have, it may jeopardize Turkey’s position with the
West, and create a situation in which its goals for becoming a part of the
international community, for both the West and East, will fail.
Though the decline in relations may not be as detrimental to Turkey as they
may prove to be for Israel, there are losses for Turkey. Not for nothing, Israel and
Turkey have had strong social ties in the past. In fact, Turkey was a subject of pride
for many Israelis, and with this came a great industry, tourism. Due to the recent
events, Israelis are boycotting Turkey, and the number of Israeli tourists visiting
Turkey has reduced dramatically. This has resulted in a 400 million dollar loss in the
Turkish tourism business. The many charter flights to Turkey from Israel have
declined significantly. Individual flight companies, such as Turkish Liras, have had
severe losses because of cancelations (Friedman). Turkey has tried to combat this
by inviting and urging Muslims to come and tour Turkey (Eglash).
As far as Turkish ability to retaliate and boycott a sector of Israeli business, it
will be a bit more difficult. As Bilfesky has said, “You won’t find any [Israeli goods] in
Turkish supermarkets”. Most of the Israeli products found in Turkey are in the form
of technology, computers, cell phones, and GPS devices. However, even though there
are Israeli tourists boycotting, most other sectors of Turkish‐Israeli economic ties
are business as usual. The business has not been jeopardized in Turkey as of yet. In
fact Turkey uses Israeli markets to sell to America (Bilfesky). In this case, It appears
that profit is more important than the political situation. The AKP is able to maintain
itself in power due to good politics and a commitment to economic growth.
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Part of Davutoglu’s goals includes Turkey’s desire and necessity for proper
foreign relations, its ability to be a mediator in the region. Ozel explains that Turkey
considers the Israeli‐Palestinian conflict as an important issue in international
politics (26). As previously seen, the AKP has tried to engage HAMAS, and Erdogan
has created ample public discourse as to how Israel has committed grave crimes as
far as Gaza is concerned. This is a central part of what the decline in relations is
about.
For Turkey, it creates an inconstancy between its frustrations, and its own
agenda in the region. With the decline in relations, Israel will be less likely to allow
for Turkish‐mediated talks. There is also the issue that talking with HAMAS
ultimately may prove to undermine all other peace initiatives that Israel and the PA
have attempted to make. With the loss of Israel as a key strategic partner, it loses its
mediating abilities throughout the Middle East, and on an issue which Turkey has
named as critical.
Rough ties between Israel and Turkey will subsequently influence the ties
between Turkey and the United States. As much as the two nations are separate
countries, typically the foreign policy of both nations have coincided. The U.S has
determined its relations with Turkey based upon the needs of NATO, and its own
foreign security (Migdavolwitz 26). Furthermore, it has historically been impressed
with Turkey’s ability to maintain relations with Israel, unlike most other Muslim
countries in the region. Hilary Clinton visited Turkey shortly after the Obama
administration took power. She declared that Turkey and the United States have a
common interest to uphold democratic principles, and reiterated the notion that in
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Turkey Islam and democracy are coexisting. In addition, after the constitutional
referendum of September 2010, Obama had made efforts to congratulate Erdogan
and his government for improving the quality of democracy (Migdavolwitz 28).
Some of the same concerns that Israel has concerning new Turkish policies in
the international arena are points of concern of Turkey as well. For example,
Turkey’s relations with Iran and Syria are a point of concern for the United States.
As well Turkey’s failure to recognize HAMAS as a terrorist organization creates
worries in Washington (Migdavolwitz 29). These changes in Turkish foreign policy
have created doubts in the US‐Turkish relationship. After the verbal attacks by
Erdogan on Israel policies, the Obama administration had also threatened to stop
military interactions between the U.S. and Turkey if Turkey continued to “shun”
Israel (Service). Recall that the United States had pulled Turkey into NATO in 1950,
and continues to have Turkish security in mind with their foreign policy actions.
Furthermore, Obama stressed that it is imperative for Turkey to ease the strains
between Turkey and Israel. This is one example of the strains between U.S.‐Turkish
relations caused by Israeli‐Turkish relations.
According to Migdalovitz, not only is there growing concern over the
intentions of Ankara when dealing with the Middle East, but also post‐flotilla there
has been a further strain on the relationship. Washington felt as though Turkey was
making the United States choose between its relationship with Turkey and Israel
(14). There were a few in Congress, previously adamant supporters of the Turkish‐
Israeli relationship and its consequential benefit to ties between Turkey and the
West, who stressed their concern. Subsequently, Obama’s administration holds the
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stance that it is important to work on maintaining and improving the Turkish‐Israel
relationship (Migdalovitz 15). Thus, although there are hopes for the future of their
relationship, the U.S.‐Turkey relationship relies upon the grander U.S.‐Turkey‐Israel
triangle.
The United States is an actor that Turkey needs to maintain good relations
with. The U.S. gives plenty of aid to Turkey and it should make sure, for the sake of
domestic affairs that the U.S. continues to provide this aid. For example, the United
States USAID program is the one responsible for constructing the water structure in
Istanbul, an important program for Turkish citizens to obtain water. Also, the United
States provides economic programming to aid in Turkey. One of the programs
works with economic factors to counter the anti‐terrorism programming in Turkey.
The United States AID program also set up a program in 2006 that encourages
bilateral trade between the United States and Turkey (USAID Greenbook). The two
nations have had a historically positive relationship, and in 2009 President Obama
made his first diplomatic visit to Turkey, during which he emphasized the
importance of the relationship between the two nations (US Department of States).
The U.S. relations with Turkey provide a great deal for the nation.
The unraveling relations between Israel and Turkey add to the concerns of
Washington. These concerns could lead to a downfall in Turkish‐US relations as well
as Israeli‐Turkish relations. With increasing action against Israel, and measures that
Turkey has taken contrary to Western ideology, the U.S. develops more concern
towards Turkey. These sentiments are mirrored by anti‐American sentiment that is
being experienced in Turkey. There is a significant rise in Turkish nationalism in
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Turkey (Grigoraidis 2‐3). With the clashing anti‐Americanism in Turkey that has
been triggered by this nationalism, and U.S. concern caused partially by the Turkey‐
Israel downfall, there is reason to fret about the relations between Turkey and
Israel.
Yet, Turkey has made an effort to create an environment in the Middle East
that the EU would approve of. With these efforts in place, it seems as though Turkey
values the opinion of the European Union and the United States. For example,
Turkey had created stronger military exchanges with Syria, yet did not proceed in
any major way because of its ties to NATO. Also, the EU is especially important to
Turkey based upon its public’s opinion. In a public opinion poll from Turkey in 2010
65 percent of the population thought it would a “good” thing for Turkey to attain
membership into the EU (Harris Interactive 49). This is capered to only 27 percent
who opposed joining the EU. Furthermore, the desire stems from the belief that
joining the EU would bring economic stability and lower the unemployment rate in
Turkey (Harris interactive 50). Thus, at the least, the relationship between Turkey
and the EU should be of top priority.
As Israel has suffered due to perceptions, and lack of attention to the
importance of strong public relations, Turkey may experience some of the same in
coming years. Western perception of Turkey is on the fence, with many of its
actions, and more importantly its words. As Turkey becomes an increasingly more
dominant figure in the Middle East, taking on its desired role as soft power, Ankara,
and specifically leaders of the AKP should be careful of the rhetoric they project.
There are legitimate and illegitimate claims against Israel, and Turkey is owner to
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both schools of thought. With all of Davutoglu’s philosophy of inclusion, and a zero‐
problem foreign policy, it is puzzling as to why Israel is so harshly criticized by
Turkey, especially since Turkey engages with many disagreeable international
actors. Though there are many rational explanations to why Turkey is better off
without Israel as a strategic ally, as previously described, much of the message
coming from Ankara smacks of anti‐Semitism, and putting Israel at a much higher
standard than all of its neighbors. Anti‐Semitism will not be tolerable to the West,
and could ultimately hurt Turkey’s position with the West. If Turkey does desire a
widespread, West‐meets‐East, total foreign policy, it should be hesitant to be
publicly anti‐Semitic Many scholars believe that this will create major worries
within the West.
The most potent example of these inequalities, and the anti‐Semitism that is
possibly the root cause of Turkey’s new foreign policy towards Israel, is how Israel
is treated as compared to how Sudan is treated. Taking a look at how Turkey
welcomed Omar Al‐Bashir, the president of Sudan, even after it had publically
attacked Israel for crimes against humanity, paints a vivid picture. Israel has been
raised to a higher standard than all surrounding countries in the eyes of Turkey, and
the explanation may lie on the anti‐Semitic sentiment of Erdogan’s government.
The conflict in Sudan arose in 2003 when two rebel groups, the Sudan
Liberation Movement and the Justice and Equality movement in Darfur, made
attacks against the national government. The government of Sudan led by Al‐Bashir
then began a counter attack, initially aimed at these two groups. The government
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sent its army‐militia, called the janjaweed (savedarfur). This Sudanese government
ultimately targeted ethnic groups within villages.
Between 2003 and 2005 an estimated 300,000 people were killed, millions
were displaced, and even more were affected by the crisis (SaveDarfur). The Bush
Administration recognized the crisis in Darfur as genocide. He also created an
initiative that brought aid to Darfur from the United States, and thus, the U.S. is
responsible for providing 60 percent of the aid to Darfur (Natsios). Considering the
ongoing killings in Darfur genocide is the mainstream ideology from the Western
school of thought.
The Muslim world, which in recent years Turkey has brought to the top of its
priority list, has been quiet about the Darfur genocide. The Muslim world in general
has been defensive about the term that the West has used: genocide. Turkey,
desiring a strong unification of the Muslim world to further its own political agenda,
would then be wary of contradicting such findings (Ozkan and Akgun 5‐6). Ozkan
and Akgun argue that in regards to Darfur, Turkey is juggling the Western and
Middle Eastern perception in a “quiet diplomacy”(10). It does not want to anger
either party.
Though Ozan and Akgun argue that Turkey has had quiet diplomacy, there is
evidence that the AKP is leaning towards the Muslim world on its stance on Darfur.
In 2008 Ankara welcomed Al‐Bashir in his high profile visit to the country, which
drew some attention from the West, and especially the United States (Meral 81).
This visit can be explained by the political and economic importance that Sudan has
on Turkey, as a Middle East soft power. The Arab Union (AU) supports the growing
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economy of Sudan, as does the OIC, where Turkey, under the AKP, wishes to hold
more significance. Statements out of the OIC have proclaimed that there is no
evidence to solidify that the actions taken against the civilians in Darfur are in fact
genocide (Ozkan and Akgun 9). Furthermore, Sudan has been a gateway for Turkey
into the African market, and the trade between Ankara and Khartoum more than
tippled, from 35 million dollars a year in 2002 to 200 million dollars a year in 2007
(Ozkan and Akgun 10).
With the growing interests in Sudan, the AKP has been very “political” in
interacting with Sudan. Not only did Ankara not protest the OIC position on whether
or not there is a genocide in Sudan, Erdogan had publicly stated “I have been to
Darfur as prime minister, and I did not detect [any] genocide there…no Muslim
could perpetrate such a thing” (Zalewski 101). Moreover, Erdogan, and his
government criticized the West for its views on Darfur, and proclaimed that it was
too harsh on the country. The policy that the AKP is emitting includes an inclusive,
non‐critical stance on many regions, including Darfur and even welcomed the
Sudanese president.
In contrast to Turkey’s understanding relationship with Sudan, its situation
with Israel is drastically different. Erdogan in particular has had many harsh words
towards Israel and its policies. For example, it has called the flotilla incident a
massacre and a crime against humanity (Zelweski 100). As previously stated,
Turkey has proclaimed that Israel is the root source of problems for stability in the
region. Erdogan and his AKP government have stated that Israel is promoting “state
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terrorism”. The question, then, is how does this make sense with the grand picture
of Turkish foreign policy?
First, the facts do not add up. With the dismissal by Turkey of the genocide in
Darfur, how can it then call Israel’s flotilla raid a massacre and a crime against
humanity? Moreover, when Ankara has been questioned about its relations with
Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah, and some of the atrocities which those countries are
responsible for, it has responded by saying that it is a part of their respective
internal issues and is not a priority of Turkey (Zalewksi 98‐99). Why does Israel not
have that same luxury of having internal problems, which are not of Turkish
concern? 13 Furthermore, the economic deficits on the tourism industry from the
Israeli boycott on Turkish travel have double the annual trade between Ankara and
Khartoum. Does this not factor into play for the AKP?
One factor in the situation may be a cause of the criticism Israel has been
receiving at a much higher, more brutal rate than their neighbors. With the
emphasis on Muslim unity in the Middle East, it is a slippery slope between
identifying with another nation, and being prejudice against another nation because
it does not share the same quality. There is anti‐Semitic public rhetoric projected by
the AKP. According to Blackwell Encyclopedia, anti Semitism is “hostility or hatred
directed at Jews. Anti‐Semitism may be manifested as prejudicial attitudes or
discriminatory actions toward Jews because of their racial, ethnic, and/or religious

Granted there are different circumstances within Israel, for the interactions
between Israel are with another potential state.
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heritage” (Bartkowski) 14 . One vivid example of such sentiment is after the flotilla
incident when Erdogan was quoted saying “The world now perceives the Star of
David alongside the swastika” (Zalewksi 100). Erdogan had given a speech at
Istanbul University filled with anti‐Semitic remarks. He told the university that the
Jews were controlling the media and skewing the Gaza situation for the world to
sympathize with them (Orbis 142). This amount of anti‐Semitism from the leader of
a country may account for some of Turkey’s policies towards Israel. The anti‐
Semitism would also explain excluding Israel even with Davutoglu’s approach to
foreign policy.
If the anti‐Semitism that is perpetrated by the AKP, and more specifically
Erdogan, is not terminated it will be a point of contestation with the West. If in fact
this same rhetoric continues, it can be a turn for the worst for ties between Turkey
and the United States and the European Union. As Zalewski says “It [AKP] has
alienated a large segment of the Western political class” (102). The West will not
likely tolerate anti‐Semitic rhetoric, and Turkey will not be able to hold onto its
historical ties with the West.
As far as Turkey is concerned, even if the ties with the West and the US
decline, it may not be devastating to Turkish foreign policy. First of all, there are few
indications that the ramifications for Turkey by the U.S. would accumulate to a
devastating loss for Turkey. As Obama’s visit in 2009 stated, the Turkish‐U.S.
alliance is important to the Obama administration. Second, the West has not yet
This is different from Anti‐Zionism, which argues that there need not be a Jewish
state, which is also different from anti‐Israel, which opposes the actions of the
Israeli government.
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accepted Turkey; rather it has constantly rejected its membership to the EU. The
Middle East and Muslim nations have been welcoming to Turkey, under its AKP
leadership, and it is logical to re‐enforce these new strategic ties. Furthermore, with
a rise in nationalism, and AKP’s determination to maintain democracy in its nation,
the party in place may shift.
The decline in the Israeli‐Turkish relationship has had an impact on Turkey,
but unlike in Israel, it is not all negative. On the negative side, the trend towards
anti‐Semitic remarks made by Erdogan specifically, will eventually have a negative
yield in its future relationship between the EU and the U.S. Furthermore, U.S. foreign
policy currently has unwavering support for Israel; thus, the Turkish‐U.S.
relationship potentially will be hindered if the negativity towards Israel continues.
The decline in relations has created an unstable tourist industry within Turkey,
which in the summer of 2010 created a campaign to attract new visitors. The
economic relationship has, for the most part, remained intact, for both countries are
fearful of economic instability. The instability in the 60‐year strong relation has
taken away some of Turkey’s political leverage within Israel, and ability to mediate
the Palestinian‐Israeli conflict. On a different note, the decline in relations between
Israel and Turkey has alleviated Turkey from the security threats that an alliance
with Israel entails. It has allowed Turkey to be a stronger player in the region due to
the perceptions amongst Arab countries. Without a strong relationship between
Turkey and Israel, the neighboring countries have more respect for Turkey, allowing
it the position of soft power that it covets. With the decline of Turkish‐Israeli
relations, Turkey’s position in the Middle East has moved to the top of its priority.
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Conclusions : Where will the relations go from here?

Turkey
Losses

Gains

Decline in Israeli tourism

Focus on relations with other
nations i.e. Iran and Syria
Disassociation with Israeli
security threats
Improved perception on
Turkey by its Arab neighbors

Loss of soft power within
Israel
Potential loss of US/ West

Israel
Losses
Lost greatest ally in the
region
Potentially stronger
Iran and Syria and
larger threats in the
region
Decline in the
perception of Israel by
other nations

Gains
Stronger ties with the
Balkans

The past few years prove that an easy resolution for the broken relationship
between Israel and Turkey in the near future does not seem like an option. Turkey
and Israel have had different experiences due to the decline in relations. Israel has
suffered, and will continue to suffer, more because of the loss of relations. Any
attempt to improve the relations with the AKP in control of the Turkish parliament
has been fruitless. Though the options look slim, with the recent developments in
the Middle East, Egypt in particular, combined with the possibility of political
change within Turkey, there may be a chance the Israeli‐Turkish relationship will be
salvaged.
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The chart above demonstrates the costs and benefits for Turkey and Israel
respectively due to their loss of relations. The Turkish tourism industry has suffered
because of the Israeli boycott of Turkey, and there was a call for Muslim tourist to
help neutralize this effect. The loss of relations has initiated a decline in Turkey’s
ability to negotiate and contribute to finding a solution for the Palestinian‐Israeli
conflict. The actions Turkey has taken against Israel and its actions within the region
have the potential to put Turkish‐West and more specifically Turkish‐U.S. relations
at risk. However, Turkey has also gained a substantial amount due to the change in
Israeli‐Turkish relations. It has been able to improve its relations with other nations,
most notably those with Iran and Syria. It has distanced itself from an association
with the Israeli national security threat, meaning that it will not stand by Israel and
put its own national security in jeopardy for the sake of Israel. Lastly, neighboring
Arab nations no longer view the Turkish‐Israeli relation as a strategic threat. Turkey
has now made it clear where its loyalties are in regards to the Palestinian issue. Due
to these changes, Turkey is more accepted today in the Middle East than it has been
over the last 60 years.
From an Israeli standpoint, the loss of relations appears bleak. Turkey had
been the first predominately Muslim country to recognize Israel, and from that point
and until recently, Israeli‐Turkish relation had been a source of pride for Israel. That
pride is now gone. Israel has lost a sense of security in the region due to the
increased interactions between Turkey‐Iran‐Syria. Iran and Syria’s previous
military actions and political rhetoric demonstrate that these two states posses a
grave threat to Israel. The threat is now magnified with Turkey’s current
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engagement with these polities. The only benefit for Israel in the loss of the relations
with Turkey is its increased political and economic ties with the Balkans, most
significantly Greece. However, this is a minute benefit in light of all of its losses. All
in all, the diminished strategic relations between Israel and Turkey has had a much
more negative effect on Israel.
There have been signs from both countries that reveal a desire to improve
their mutual relations, though these desires have yet to prove fruitful. Interestingly
enough, Turkey appears to be open to mending relations between Israel. “Hate each
other they may, both governments have come around to understanding that
Turkish‐Israeli ties have a significance beyond their immediate limits” (Idiz). The
relations of Turkey and Israel have a greater meaning for the rest of the region, and
the nations understand this. It appears that in the long run, for the sake of the
Middle East, both nations will put forth the effort into rebuilding some form of
political trust.
The AKP has put one major condition on whether to proceed with rebuilding
the relations between Israel and Turkey. The condition is an apology from Israel for
its actions on the Mavi Marmara. However, it is interesting that the AKP would be
open to rebuilding Turkish‐Israeli relations at all, considering many of the
advantages it has gained due to recent changes. One explanation could be that
Turkey, and more specifically Davutoglu, is trying to stand by its new foreign policy
philosophy of inclusion. Also, Turkey is interested in being a mediator in the region,
and an Israeli apology might prove beneficial for Turkey’s credibility. Israel is a
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player in the Middle East, and for what its worth, proper relations will advance
Turkey as a rising leader.
The improvement in relations requires an apology. Erdogan has called upon
Israel to apologize for its actions against Turkish citizens who were killed on the
Mavi Marmara ship, part of the flotilla sent to aid Gaza on May 31st 2010. During a
visit to Lebanon in November of 2010, Erdogan implored Israel to apologize for its
actions. In a very powerful quote, Erdogan expressed that he believes that the fate of
Israel rests upon the fate of the Middle East. In order for Israel to enjoy peace,
Erdogan contends that it must take action for itself and apologize for the acts it
committed against Turkey.
The people of Israel should see this now. If peace comes to that region, Israel
would win as the region wins. If there is war in this region, Israel’s people
will be harmed as people of the region will be harmed. That is why we call on
Israel to turn back from its mistakes, apologize and accept peace. Azbarez
Staff 11.24.2010
In late December of 2010, Erdogan renewed his demand for an apology from Israel,
in order to proceed with the rebuilding of Israeli‐Turkish relations. Along with
reasserting Turkey’s demands, Erdogan also criticized the U.S. and the EU for
standing with Israel, even with its mistakes (Press TV 12.20.10).
However, Netanyahu’s government has yet to offer an apology. In light of its
grave losses because of the decline in relations, it seems puzzling that Israel would
not seize the opportunity to amend its relation with Turkey. This is not to say that
Netanyahu’s government has not made efforts to fix the dying relations. Israel
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understands that Turkey is a rising power in the Middle East. Furthermore, Israel
understands that it is best to do what is in its power to mend the ties.
There are efforts from the Israeli side to bandage that which has been
bruised between Israel and Turkey. For example, Prime Minister Netanyahu
commended secret talks between Israel and Turkey that were aimed at recovering
the relations. These talks happened in early July, even prior to Erdogan re‐
requesting an apology from Israel in order to move forward. While praising these
secret talks, Netanyahu stressed that Israel will not apologize for what happened in
May. He continued to say that Israel has sympathy for those killed in the incident;
however, he stands by the notion that Israel is not guilty of anything (Netanyahu
rules out apology 7.03.10).
The debate as to whether or not Israel should apologize stems from the two
different investigations of the Flotilla incident. The UN Security Council created a
fact‐finding mission to uncover the issues with the flotilla attack on May 31st 2010.
To start the investigation, the UN Human Rights Council first and foremost found the
blockade on Gaza, which those aboard the flotilla were concerned with, to be
unlawful. The council proclaimed that the blockade went against international laws
because at the time of the blockade there was a human rights crisis in Gaza
(Siddique). Subsequently, the UN fact‐finding mission found that the actions of the
Israeli Defense Force (IDF) were unlawful as well. The report found the violence
used against the Turkish civilians both unnecessary and disproportionate to the
threat that was imposed upon the IDF. The findings read:
The conduct of the Israeli military and other personnel towards the flotilla
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passengers was not only disproportionate to the occasion but demonstrated
levels of totally unnecessary and incredible violence. It betrayed an
unacceptable level of brutality. (Humans Rights Council)
The Israeli government did not agree with the UN Security Council’s fact‐
finding mission, and thus has issued its own investigation of the incident. The Israeli
investigation, the Turkel Commission, which was led by Justice Jacob Turkel, found
the IDF’s actions on May 31st 2010 to be legal. First, the Commission found the naval
blockade against Gaza to be legal. Furthermore, the commission proclaimed that the
IDF was acting out of self‐defense (Report of Public Commission).
Differences between the findings show that there is room for interpretation
with the Gaza flotilla incident. As far as Netanyahu is concerned, he would like to
improve relations with Turkey because it would benefit his nation. However,
Netanyahu will not put his own soldiers and military officers under unmerited
scrutiny from the rest of the world to allow relations between Israeli and Turkey to
proceed properly (Ravid). Israel has also asked Turkey to recognize that the IDF did
not act in a malicious manner and that the death of the nine Turkish citizens was not
the intent of the IDF (Keinon). This offers an explanation as to why Israel would be
reluctant to apologize to Turkey for its actions in the flotilla incident.
A second reason for Israel to refuse to apologize to Turkey for the death of its
citizens is due to current domestic political environment in Israel. This is what one
author calls the “Lieberman factor” (Idiz). Avigdor Lieberman is the Israeli foreign
mister as well as the head of the far‐right part of Netanyahu’s government, the
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Yisrael Beiteinu party 15 . In terms of the Palestinian‐Israeli conflict the advocates for
a two state solution but offers little compromise. He rejects the idea of a shared
Jerusalem and constantly questions the loyalty of Arab‐Israeli citizens (Reuters). He
has more radical, right wing opinions as to whether or not Israel should be
apologizing to Turkey. He believes, in fact, that Turkey should apologize to Israel for
the incident altogether. He is strong in his beliefs, and refutes any criticism by
simply saying that he has a right to his own opinion (Idiz). Lieberman believes that
Turkey is abusing its relationship with Israel and using Israel as its scapegoat
(Ozerkan).
Lieberman’s party represents 11.2% of the Israeli Knesset, while
Netanyahu’s Likud party makes up 22.3%, and the leading opposition group,
Kadima, represents 23.2% of the Knesset. Netanyahu was successful in creating his
coalition majority government; this includes 74 out of 120 seats of the Knesset (CIA
factbook). Part of his coalition is Lieberman’s Yisrael Beiteinu, which gives light to
why Lieberman’s words, aside from him being the foreign minister, carry such a
heavy weight within Netanyahu’s government. He needs the party to be content
with his actions because there is always the threat that it can withdraw from the
coalition.
Lieberman has displayed opposition to Tzipi Livni, leader of the Kadima
party, a more centrist party in the Israeli Knesset. Livni has suggested that such
policies are a threat to Israeli national security. She had implied in a radio interview
with Israeli army radio, that Lieberman should be taking a greater risk with Israeli
He was previously part of Netanyahu’s Likud party. Also Yisrael Beiteinu means
Israel is our home in Hebrew.

15
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foreign policy decisions. Livini believes that stepping outside of his comfort zone
and apologizing would be an appropriate approach for Lieberman (Idiz). Lieberman
and his party have been able to win votes for Knesset through its hawkish stance on
the Palestinian‐Israeli conflict, which encompasses the Gaza flotilla incident. In
order to win battles at home, Lieberman is using the issue of Turkey to stick by his
right wing views, and a compromise to these may affect his position within his
party, making him seem weak.
However, as much as Livni expresses a need for the country to take more of a
risk, and sacrifice a bit of its pride, for the sake of foreign policy, Netanyahu’s views
reside with Lieberman. Netanyahu has stated, “Israel cannot apologize because
Israel’s soldiers had to defend themselves to avoid being lynched by a crowd”
(Netanyahu rules out apology). This issue represents the internal battle within the
Israeli government. The unified voice may not represent the will of all, and it could
put Israel in jeopardy. This is an example of how an international issue is greatly
affected by internal political conflict between Livni’s party and Lieberman’s party
(Idiz).
The result of this internal feud may prove detrimental to the health of Israeli
international security. The repercussions on Israel from Turkey because it will not
apologize will create an increased distance between the two nations. This is the
opposite effect that Israel desires. Erdogan has called Netanyahu’s government “The
worst government Israel has ever seen” (Keinon 1.12.11). He is mainly referring to
the stance and influence Lieberman is taking within the Israeli government. This
point of contestation is unacceptable as far as Erdogan is concerned. His citizens
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were killed in the incident and that merits an apology. Furthermore, as Idiz explains,
Davutoglu is requesting that Israel take it upon itself to mend the situation and take
responsibility for its actions. Though this stance presumes that Israel is at fault, the
reality is that the Israeli‐Turkish relationship is much more important for Israel
than it is for Turkey, as outlined at the opening of this chapter. Therefore, the Israeli
government should seriously rethink its stance on whether or not it will apologize
for the deaths that resulted from the flotilla incident. It may be better for Israel to
reluctantly disregard its pride and apologize.
On the other hand, there is an important factor in the decline of relations,
which help rationalize Israel’s position of standing by its actions and refusing to
apologize. The flotilla incident is not the sole cause of the decline in relations. As has
been expressed, the decline of Turkish‐Israeli relations started when the AKP party
came to office in 2002. In fact, if Israel does apologize to the Turkish government for
its actions, this alone would not necessarily yield an improvement in relations
between Israel and Turkey. The flotilla event did not cause the decline; rather it was
a result of a frayed relationship. If Israel does go against its own actions and
apologizes, it may prove ineffective. There could be domestic political repercussions
for Netanyahu’s government, which explains the risks involved in apologizing to
Turkey.
Thus far, the strategic relationship between Turkey and Israel has been
following a downward trend. With the remarks and actions from both Ankara and
Jerusalem, any attempt to rebuild the relationship has failed. It is worth noting that
while the attempts have failed the two nations have not yet put forth their best
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efforts to mend the relationship. Both sides leave little room for compromise, and,
with domestic politics interfering, it is a hard situation to navigate. However, all
hope is not lost. There are a few aspects to the current circumstance in each country
domestically, as well as in the rest of the Middle East that shed a ray of light upon
the fading relationship between Israel and Turkey.
Though domestic politics has been a cause in preventing Israel from working
on its ties with Turkey, in light of the recent Egyptian revolution, there should, and
most likely will be, serious adjustments to the Israeli foreign policy stance. The
overthrowing of former president Mubarak in Egypt, an ally to Israel with whom it
maintained a cold peace for the past 30 years, puts Israel in a much less secure
position in the Middle East. Now, with Egyptian elections in the future, Israel cannot
rest assured that the next ruling party will maintain the peace treaty between Israel
and Egypt. It most likely will not be as supportive as Mubarak’s regime was. This is
likely to affect how Israel henceforth responds to Turkish requests.
Although, Egypt was a very significant ally for Israel in the region, throughout
the protests Israel remained quiet. Even in light of Mubarak’s benefits to Israeli
foreign policy, it was difficult for Israel to react to the Egyptian revolution. Israel did
not want to support the pro‐democracy protests, given the chance that Mubarak
remained in power and would thus be offended. Nor did Israel want to support
Mubarak for it would be perceived as supporting brutal dictatorship (Bronner 1). As
Levi explains, throughout the relationship, if Israel ever needed the world’s
approval or regional legitimacy, it would turn to Mubarak’s regime to take this role.
Egypt became a crucial part of Israeli foreign policy and during the past few weeks,
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the Israelis have been very apprehensive as to what will come next (Levi). As
Bronner explains, if the next regime moves away from the current position of peace
with Israel, it is going to have extreme repercussions. Israel relied on Egypt for
about 40 percent of its oil imports as well as help with negotiations for peace with
the Palestinians (Bronner 1).
The first obvious concern would be that Israel will lose its current standing
with Egypt. It would have to secure the Egyptian border, creating more military
concerns for Israel. This would revert the Egyptian border back to the hostile border
it used to be. The other main concern is that Egypt not only has kept a peace with
Israel, but it has been an example for other nations. If Egypt regresses away from
the peace with Israel, Israeli officials fear that the other nations in the region,
including the Palestinians, will be even more reluctant to form ties with Israel.
Furthermore, there is a possibility that the new power in Egypt will decrease the
power of the moderate Palestinians, the PA, and increase the power of Hamas
(Bronner 2).
Zvi Mazel, a former Israeli ambassador to Egypt, advises Israel, “Forget about
the former Egypt. Now it’s a completely new reality, and it won’t be easy”
(Associated Press JPOST). With this in mind, Israel is in a much tighter situation in
the Middle East, which will affect its stance on foreign policy. The reaction from
Israeli President Shimon Peres reiterates what Mazel is referring to. Peres has made
it clear that he believes that the large target on Israel’s back is because of the
Palestinian‐Israeli conflict. In light of the dynamics that will emerge from the regime
change in Egypt, it is imperative that Israel elevates itself of this target. To
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accomplish this, Peres has stated that Israel must make more concessions and
compromises to achieve the two state solution needed for peace between the
Palestinians and the Israelis. In the words of Peres: “The peace process is now
crucial for our neighbors, and not just us. A true compromise, as painful as it may be,
is preferable to the dangers that would be created in its absence” (Ravid). This new
rhetoric stems from the changes in the region.
The new dynamic means that Israel’s interactions with Turkey are likely to
change, hopefully making the relations between the two nations stronger. Israel
potentially will lose the support of Egypt, and because of this the two other regional
allies, Jordan and Turkey, will look much more appealing. Israel, and more
specifically the right winged Lieberman, may reassess the significance of Turkey’s
relationship to see that it means a lot to Israel. Apologizing without the guarantee of
a positive outcome in relations, while having Egypt’s backing for many of its actions,
does not seem likely. Now that Turkey looks to be potentially more important than
the future Egyptian nation as an ally to Israel, it looks more promising that Israel
would leave behind domestic political issues and apologize.
If Egypt does push Israel to make strides with the Palestinian‐Israeli conflict
it will alleviate much of the contestation between Turkey and Israel. If
advancements are made, Turkey will most likely warm up to Israel, even without an
apology. Much of the criticism of Israel that comes out of Ankara attacks Israel’s
behavior with Gaza, and the injustices Ankara feels Israel commits against the
Palestinian people. Erdogan especially has delivered many statements, albeit with
an anti‐Semitic undertone, against Israeli action in Gaza. As Ayturk explains, “The
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crisis over Gaza has exposed the Achilles’ heel for this [Turkish and Israel]
relationship; Turkish governments will always feel embarrassed of their ties with
Israel…” (Ayturk 71). Without Israel’s conflict with the Palestinian people, Turkey
would lose the source of much of its frustration with Israel.
Although, President Peres is propelling these notions that Israel must
compromise and calls on the Israelis to form peace, the concept is extremely
idealistic. To say the least, Coming up with a proper solution to the Palestinian‐
Israeli conflict is a tall order for Israel to fill. With all the time and energy that has
been spent on trying to mend the Palestinian‐Israeli conflict, which presides over
the region, to suddenly ignore the frustrations and, as Peres says, fix this problem
immediately seems to be a grave challenge.
First, part of the problem with a quick solution is that thus far, much of the
negotiation has taken place in Egypt. Unfortunately, after the regime switch this will
more likely than not cease to be the case (Levi). Secondly, attempts to create a
positive situation have not yielded the desired results, that being peace. Levi
suggests that in order for Israel to accomplish what Peres is urging, Israel must take
extreme leaps. He suggests that Israel regress back to the 1967 borders, then the
nation must acknowledge the misplaced Palestinians, and subsequently provide as
much of a compensation as the nation is able to give. And finally, Levi believes that
Israel must be ready and willing to give full rights to all citizens including Arabs
living under the state of Israel. There appears to be a large challenge in developing a
conclusion to the conflict. However, it should not be considered out of the question.
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Aside from the recent changes in the Middle East, another aspect of Turkish‐
Israeli relations is subject to change. Much of the contestations between the two
nations stems from the fact that the AKP is in power in Turkey. The AKP emphasizes
Turkey’s position as a regional power, creating a stronger bond between both Iran
and Syria. Much of the decline in Israeli‐Turkish relations has roots in the change in
2002 of the Turkish leadership. However, one thing that can help the Turkish‐Israeli
relationship is that Turkey is a democracy and therefore, the political power that
runs the country can change as soon as the next election in 2011.
If there were to be a change in the political power that controls Turkey, it
would be good news for Israel based upon the opposition parties in Turkey. The
leading opposition group is the Republican’s People party (CHP), which was the
political group of Kemal Ataturk. In recent years, this party has had a lot of
opposition to the actions of the AKP. For example, on the issue of Iran and Syria, the
CHP has a lot of trepidation concerning the increase of relations between Turkey
and those two nations. Osam Koruturk, who is head of foreign policy within the CHP,
has expressed dismay towards Davutoglu’s actions as foreign minister. He
expressed frustrations when Davutoglu, at an international meeting in Munich,
refused to sit in a meeting at which an Israeli representative was in attendance.
Koruturk expressed that these actions were detrimental to Turkish foreign policy,
for he had to sit in on the meeting in his place, and it lost Turkey some mediation
power. This exemplifies the way in which Davutoglu’s sentiments towards Israel are
negatively affecting Turkey’s international relations on a whole (Demiratas).
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The CHP also has expressed great opposition not only on general Turkish
affairs, but also specifically, as to how Turkey should be engaging (or not) with
Israel. Kemal Kilicdaroglu is the head of the CHP, and has drastic criticisms for the
AKP in how it handled the flotilla situation in May of 2010. Kilicdaroglu believes that
Turkey should not have allowed the group, who initiated the flotilla to leave from
Turkey, when it was made clear by Israeli officials that Israel would stop them. He
believes that the Mavi Marmara instigated the reaction from Israel, and it is because
of this that the Israeli relation with Turkey was shaken to the core (Middle East
Online 2.2.11). With this type of rhetoric from the AKP’s largest opposition party in
the Turkish parliament, it is evident that the relations would be different if the AKP
was not in power. With the CHP in power, Israel and Turkey would more likely than
not attain a sound relationship.
The good news for Israel, and for Israeli‐Turkish relations, is that Turkey is a
democracy, and the CHP has the ability to regain power. In recent years, the CHP has
not campaigned properly to gain the votes that are needed in order to win elections.
This, along with the AKP’s grassroots efforts to gain votes and its strong economic
policies, enabled the AKP to stay on top. In recent years, however, it seems that AKP
may start to lose its leadership in the Turkish parliament. Looking at some minority
parties within Turkey, there is evidence that the AKP can potentially lose its
support. The leaders of these parties, upon seeing and hearing the actions of
Erdogan in regards to the Gaza flotilla no less, decided it best to band together
behind the Republicans’ People party (Kenner). With an added push, there is a
chance the CHP will be able to win a majority in Parliament.
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To add to the cohesion between secular pro‐Western and Israeli‐friendly
opposition groups to the AKP, there seems to be a popular trend which shows that
citizens may be turned off from Erdogan’s AKP. Polls from mid 2010 show that the
support for the CHP party has risen much higher than it has been for the past few
years (Kenner). Furthermore, Kilicdaroglu is the new party leader who replaced
Deniz Baykal due to a sex scandal. Kilicdaroglu is seen as a man who can turn the
party around and has the ability to join parties together, as with the nascent Turkish
political party (Geerdink). An interesting trend within the Turkish youth mirrors
the growing opposition for the AKP. There is a recent pattern towards getting
Ataturk tattoos to show nationalist pride. This great Turkish pride has caused many
to see the Islamist AKP as somewhat of a threat to their lifestyle (Zalweski).
Turkish citizens have a growing concern with the actions of the AKP, for
reasons both related to Israel and completely disassociated with it. The CHP seems
to be a legitimate alternative for Turkish voters in the June 2011 elections. With that
said, the AKP still holds a majority in public opinion and may be able to hold onto
leadership in Turkey (Geerdink). It is not impossible though for there to be a change
in leadership, and if it does happen, it would be very beneficial for Turkish‐Israeli
relations.
The new realities of the Middle East, which were ignited by Mubarak’s
overturn, combined with a democratic atmosphere allow some optimism about
improving the Israeli‐Turkish relationship. There is hope that one of the two nations
will come around, and they will be able to work together to mend the ties, which
have been so strong in the past. Until that point, it is important to see that not all
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relations have completely deteriorated. Furthermore, not for nothing, the Israeli‐
Turkish relationship is an important symbol for the rest of the world. This was
shown when Turkey chose to stand by Israel during a time of major disaster within
the country.
On December 2nd, 2010 a forest fire was sparked in the northern Carmel
mountain of Israel. This was a natural disaster that Israel was not fully prepared to
handle. This is a startling fact because Israel is usually ready to respond
immediately to emergency situations. 16 The minister of interior, Eli Yahsi was
criticized for his poor efforts. This was the worst forest fire in Israel’s history; about
10,000 acres, and 4 million trees were burned (Kershner). At this time, regardless of
the strained relations between the two countries, Turkey was one of the first
nations to send helicopters and aid to help Israel battle the fire. Turkey sent two
firefighting airplanes earning the acknowledgment and appreciation of Netanyahu.
The Turkish media sympathized with Israel during this crisis, offering a positive
image of Israel to the Turkish public (Bronner). This awful occurrence in Israel’s
history has shown that even though there are many concerns that the Israeli‐
Turkish relationship has turned completely sour, there is still an underlying
message that Turkey and Israel continue to have each other’s interest in mind when
there is a crisis.
It seems as though there are many ways to analyze the Turkish‐Israeli
relationship, and the result it will have in the long term on both nations. For

An example is that the IDF was the first major player to be on the ground in Port
Au Prince after the earthquake hit Haiti in January 2010 (Palm Beach Post).
16
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example, a best‐case, worst‐case scenario description of the relationship is one way
to understand the details of the relationship
Worst Case Scenario: If the relations between Israel and Turkey continue
down the same path they are currently headed down, the result may be
unsalvageable. If the Israeli government does not make sacrifices and apologize for
its actions, in response to the minimum request that Ankara is asking for, the
relationship will further unravel. To add to this, if the AKP maintains control of
Ankara, and continues to attack Israel, as Lieberman says “Israel will not be
Turkey’s punching bag.” This will lead to further aggravations on the part of the
Israelis. Furthermore, if Israel is left without the help of Egypt, Israel may end up
resorting to the one power they have: might. The hostility in the region will rise, and
this will further aggravate Ankara. In this situation it would be very hard to repair
ties between Ankara and Jerusalem.
Best Case Scenario: First and foremost, Israel could apologize for the deaths
that resulted from the flotilla incident. Regardless of whether or not Israel’s actions
were legal, there were Turkish deaths when Israel and Turkey were in a time of
peace. The apology would lead to an optimistic view of Israel from the Turkish
perspective. To further improve the relations, the Republican’s People party could
gain enough political power and be voted into the leadership of the Turkish
parliament. With the CHP, whose emphasis would again revolve not only around
Turkish nationalism, but also on inclusion into the West, in power there would be
changes. These changes would be directed away from relations with unsavory
characters like Al Bashir in Sudan, and refocused on re‐building relations with
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Israel. With the new party in power, Israel and Turkey would be able to restore their
relations to what they once were.
In the real life case scenario, the most likely outcome will lie somewhere in
between the two. For the sake of the region, and for both nations, efforts in restoring
relations will likely prove beneficial. There are large hurdles to overcome for the
two nations to regain the ties they shared in the 1990s. One of these hurdles is that
Turkey has been able to find from other nations what it once needed from Israel:
regional support, military assistance. The losses are not so severe for Turkey.
However, for Israel, especially in light of recent changes in Egypt, the loss of
relations is severe and Israel should begin to take risks. Both nations should see the
long‐term advantages of maintaining ties between one another and mend their
relationship to bring more peace and stability to the Middle East.
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